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The Interest Ban on Payment Stablecoins: Yield Structures and Legal Risk

The Interest Ban on Payment Stablecoins: Yield Structures and Legal Risk. Independent digital-asset law for exchanges, issuers and funds. Cross-border scope, fi

A payments company announces a USD-pegged stablecoin with "up to 5% APY" earned on deposits held in the issuer's app. The marketing describes it as a payment instrument, not an investment product. Within weeks, the issuer receives a Wells notice from the SEC alleging an unregistered securities offering. The problem was not the stablecoin itself – it was the yield promise attached to it. Under the emerging US stablecoin framework and parallel prohibitions in other major jurisdictions, paying direct interest to holders of a payment stablecoin converts what looks like digital cash into a regulated investment product, triggering registration obligations the issuer never planned for. This analysis maps the interest ban, the yield structures issuers attempt to preserve some form of return, and the enforcement risk attached to each.

The prohibition sits at the centre of the legislative proposals circulating in Washington and in the design choices of issuers elsewhere. It reflects a regulatory judgment that a payment instrument must remain a medium of exchange, not a savings vehicle. A stablecoin intended for commercial settlement – pegged at one dollar, redeemable on demand – loses its payment-token character when the issuer or an affiliate adds a return tied to the passage of time. The legal consequence is a shift from the payment-stablecoin regulatory perimeter into the securities regime, with prospectus, registration and custody obligations that most stablecoin issuers cannot meet without restructuring the entire product. This page sets out why the ban exists, how issuers are restructuring yield mechanisms to preserve compliance, and where the practical boundaries lie for a business seeking to offer both payment functionality and a competitive return.

Why does the interest ban exist in stablecoin regulation?

The prohibition on direct interest payments to stablecoin holders originated in the policy view that a payment stablecoin should replicate the economic characteristics of fiat currency, not of a bank deposit or a money-market fund. Fiat cash in your wallet earns nothing; neither should the digital equivalent when held at face value. Regulators in the United States and in jurisdictions framing parallel regimes observed that once a token issuer offers a yield on the token balance itself, the holder's motivation shifts from transaction facilitation to return accumulation. That shift repositions the stablecoin as an investment contract under the Howey test – a security – rather than a payment instrument outside the securities perimeter.

In our cross-border licensing practice, we regularly advise issuers who underestimated the legal weight of a yield promise. The mistake is understandable: the issuer holds high-quality reserves (short-dated Treasuries, overnight repos), those reserves generate a return, and the instinct is to share part of that return with users to drive adoption. But sharing that return directly with tokenholders creates the expectation-of-profit element that completes the Howey framework. The legislative proposals circulating in Congress – principally the GENIUS Act and the STABLE Act – codify the prohibition explicitly, defining a "payment stablecoin" as one that does not pay interest to holders and making the breach of that definition a basis for enforcement under the applicable banking or securities regime.

Outside the United States, the European Union's MiCA framework adopts a parallel position for e-money tokens (EMTs). An EMT under MiCA is a stablecoin redeemable at par on demand and intended for use as a medium of exchange. MiCA permits issuers to invest the reserves and earn a return on them, but it prohibits the issuer from passing interest through to the tokenholder. The reserve yield may cover operational costs; it may not fund a holder return. The policy intent is the same: preserve the distinction between a payment rail and a deposit-taking product.

What qualifies as "interest" under the prohibition?

The prohibition extends beyond a stated APY paid monthly into the holder's wallet. Any arrangement that delivers a return contingent on holding the token over time falls within the restriction. Regulators have signaled that the label used – "rewards," "cashback," "loyalty points," "staking yield" – is irrelevant; substance governs. If the economic reality is that a holder receives more value by continuing to hold the stablecoin than by spending it immediately, the arrangement is functionally interest and likely prohibited.

The line is drawn at mechanisms where the return derives from something other than the mere passage of time and the issuer's management of reserves. Permitted structures generally fall into three categories: third-party yield (an unaffiliated platform offers the return, not the issuer), conditional incentives (a merchant cashback tied to a specific transaction, not to holding), and non-monetary utility (access to features or priority processing, not a cash-equivalent return). Each of these presents its own compliance complexity, and each sits at a different point on the enforcement risk curve.

In recent advisory work for a multi-chain payments issuer, we mapped five yield structures the team considered. Only two survived legal review. The first was a merchant-funded transaction rebate, capped per transaction and contingent on use at participating merchants. The second was a governance-token airdrop to users of the payment stablecoin, where the airdrop was discretionary, one-time, and made no reference to duration of holding. The other three structures – a monthly distribution proportional to average balance, a "hold-to-earn" mechanic that unlocked after 30 days, and a refer-a-friend bonus paid in stablecoins – all created the expectation-of-profit dynamic that converts the token into an investment product.

How do affiliate yield structures work, and what is the risk?

The most common workaround issuers attempt is to separate the payment stablecoin from the yield product by interposing an affiliate entity. The issuer creates the stablecoin and handles redemption; a sister company – technically independent, sometimes in a different jurisdiction – offers a "savings account" or "vault" that accepts deposits of the stablecoin and pays interest on those deposits. The user must affirmatively move stablecoins from the payment wallet into the yield product. The issuer argues that it is not paying interest; the affiliate is, and the affiliate operates under a different regulatory framework (often a lending or investment licence, or no licence at all if it sits offshore).

This structure is **not safe**. Regulators assess economic reality and control, not corporate form. If the affiliate is owned by the same parent, shares branding with the issuer, is marketed in the same interface, or has its yield obligations backstopped by the issuer's reserves, the separation is illusory. The SEC and the CFTC have both pursued enforcement actions against structures where a holding company created a "separate" entity to offer yield on a token issued by a sibling company. The analysis turned on common control and on whether a reasonable user would perceive the two products as integrated. In those cases, the answer was yes, and the entire token ecosystem was treated as a single unregistered offering.

In a 2024 matter, we advised a European issuer planning to launch a USD stablecoin in the United States through a Delaware corporation while routing yield through a BVI affiliate. The yield product was marketed under the same brand, accessible via a toggle in the same mobile app, and the affiliate's liabilities were collateralised by reserves held by the US issuer. We concluded that the structure would not withstand scrutiny. The common branding, the integrated user experience, and the economic interdependence of the two entities made them a single enterprise for securities-law purposes. The client restructured: the US entity issued a yield-free payment stablecoin; the BVI entity launched an entirely separate product (a bond token, clearly labeled as a security) with its own marketing, its own reserve pool, and no operational tie to the payment token. That separation held.

What about third-party platforms offering stablecoin yield?

An unaffiliated third-party platform – a DeFi lending protocol, a centralised yield aggregator, a crypto savings product operated by an independent company – may offer interest on deposits of any stablecoin, including a payment stablecoin, without converting the stablecoin itself into a security. The key distinction is control and affiliation. If the platform is not owned, directed or incentivised by the stablecoin issuer, and if users must take an affirmative step to move their tokens from the issuer's ecosystem into the platform, the yield arrangement is the platform's offering, not the issuer's. The issuer's stablecoin remains a payment instrument; the platform's product is the investment vehicle.

This is the model used by the major fiat-backed stablecoins today. Tether (USDT) and Circle (USDC) do not pay interest to holders. But dozens of third-party platforms – Aave, Compound, centralised lenders, savings apps – accept deposits of USDT or USDC and pay interest on those deposits. The issuer has no involvement in the yield product, no revenue share, no operational integration. That separation insulates the stablecoin from securities classification based on the yield activity happening downstream.

The structure breaks down if the issuer provides any meaningful support to the third-party platform. Support can take the form of co-marketing, a liquidity backstop, a revenue-sharing agreement, or a preferential redemption path for tokens deposited on the platform. Each of those connections reintroduces the affiliation risk and can cause regulators to collapse the separation and treat the arrangement as an integrated offering. In our practice, we see issuers assume that listing the stablecoin on a DeFi protocol is always safe. It usually is – but not if the issuer funded the protocol's liquidity pool, holds governance tokens in the protocol, or provided an explicit endorsement in the stablecoin's whitepaper.

Can a merchant cashback or loyalty rebate stay compliant?

Merchant-funded cashback programs can remain compliant if structured carefully. The yield must be tied to a specific transaction – not to holding the stablecoin over time – and it must be funded by the merchant or a transaction facilitator, not by the issuer from its reserves. A typical compliant structure works like this: a user pays for coffee with the stablecoin; the merchant funds a 2% rebate on that transaction, credited to the user's wallet as additional stablecoins. The rebate is contingent on the purchase, not on the duration of holding, and the economic source is the merchant's margin, not the issuer's reserve yield.

The structure moves into the risk zone if the rebates are funded or subsidised by the issuer, if they accrue based on average balance rather than transaction activity, or if they are marketed as a return on holding rather than as a merchant promotion. We advised a payments issuer in Southeast Asia that designed a loyalty program where users earned points based on transaction volume, and the points could be redeemed for stablecoins at the end of each month. The program was funded by interchange fees collected from merchants, and the points-to-stablecoin exchange rate was fixed at launch. The regulatory concern was that the monthly redemption cycle and the fixed rate created an expectation of yield tied to holding, even though the source was transaction-based. The client adjusted: points now expire in 90 days, the redemption rate floats with merchant participation, and the program documentation explicitly disclaims any return on holding. That adjustment reduced the risk to an acceptable level for launch in the target jurisdictions.

Are governance-token airdrops to stablecoin holders permissible?

A one-time airdrop of a separate governance token to users of a payment stablecoin does not, by itself, convert the stablecoin into a security – provided the airdrop is genuinely discretionary, does not create an expectation of recurring distributions, and the governance token has a documented utility in protocol governance rather than serving solely as a return vehicle. The legal framing turns on whether the airdrop is positioned as a reward for holding the stablecoin (prohibited) or as an allocation to users for governance participation in a separate protocol (permissible). Substance matters more than label.

The safer structure is an airdrop that is not announced in advance, is made once with no promise of repetition, and delivers a token with a defined governance function (voting on protocol parameters, treasury allocations, or upgrade proposals). The riskier structure is a scheduled "loyalty airdrop" that occurs quarterly, is proportional to the user's stablecoin balance, and involves a governance token that has no actual use beyond speculative trading. That structure looks like a dividend paid in another asset – economically interest, just dressed up. Regulators in the United States have challenged repeated airdrops as disguised profit distributions in enforcement actions against token issuers outside the stablecoin space; the same analysis applies here.

How do major jurisdictions compare on the interest prohibition?

The United States has not yet enacted stablecoin legislation, but the proposed bills in Congress uniformly include the interest ban. The GENIUS Act defines a payment stablecoin as one that "does not pay interest or provide any financial return to the holder," and it makes violation of that definition grounds for enforcement as an unregistered security or as unlicensed deposit-taking. The STABLE Act adopts parallel language. In the absence of enacted law, the SEC applies the Howey test: if the token generates an expectation of profit from the efforts of the issuer, it is a security, and the addition of interest satisfies that element. This enforcement posture applies today, even before the statutes pass.

Under MiCA in the European Union, an e-money token (EMT) may not pay interest to the holder. The issuer may invest the reserves and earn a return, but that return must be retained by the issuer or used to cover operational costs; it cannot be distributed to tokenholders. MiCA distinguishes EMTs from asset-referenced tokens (ARTs), which are backed by a basket of assets and may carry different return structures, but an ART that pays interest to holders becomes subject to additional capital and governance requirements. The interest prohibition is explicit in the MiCA framework and took effect in phases beginning in mid-2024.

The United Kingdom's regulatory approach to stablecoins is evolving. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has signaled that a stablecoin paying interest to holders would likely be classified as a regulated deposit or as a security, depending on the structure. The FCA has not published final rules, but the consultation papers released in recent years indicate that the policy intent aligns with MiCA and the US proposals: a payment stablecoin should not carry a holder return. Issuers operating in the UK market under the existing money-laundering registration regime are proceeding on the assumption that the interest ban will be codified when the full stablecoin framework goes live.

In Singapore, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) regulates stablecoins as Digital Payment Tokens (DPTs) under the Payment Services Act. MAS has not published an explicit interest prohibition, but its policy guidance emphasises that a DPT intended for payments should not be structured to generate investment returns for holders. A stablecoin that pays interest would likely be reclassified as a capital-markets product and subjected to securities-offering rules. The Hong Kong SFC applies a similar substance-over-form analysis: a stablecoin that pays interest is treated as a collective-investment scheme or a structured product, both of which require prospectus registration and are outside the payments perimeter.

Which yield structure fits which issuer profile?

The right structure depends on the issuer's business model, target user base, licensing posture, and enforcement-risk tolerance. An issuer launching a pure payments product in a major hub with no plan to offer returns can issue a yield-free stablecoin and avoid the entire classification problem. This is the safest route and the one most issuers in regulated hubs now follow. The stablecoin is a medium of exchange; the reserves generate income for the issuer; the holder receives none of it. Risk: minimal. Operational complexity: low.

An issuer that wants to offer a return and is prepared to register the product as a security can structure the stablecoin as a tokenised money-market fund or a bond token from the outset. The product is not marketed as a payment stablecoin; it is an investment token, clearly labeled, with a prospectus, and subject to custody and distribution rules under securities law. This structure works for a wealth-management or institutional-treasury audience but loses the payment-rail functionality that makes stablecoins attractive for commerce. Risk: compliance-intensive but legally clear. Operational complexity: high.

An issuer that wants to offer both payment functionality and some form of return must separate the two products structurally and operationally. The issuer launches a payment stablecoin (yield-free) and a separate investment product (clearly labeled as a security or a deposit account, held in a different legal entity, with separate reserves and separate marketing). Users opt into the investment product affirmatively. This structure preserves both use cases but requires two licences, two compliance stacks, and careful management of the separation to avoid imputation of the yield product back to the payment token. Risk: moderate, manageable with proper separation. Operational complexity: high.

What mistakes do issuers make when structuring yield?

The most common error is assuming that calling the product a "utility token" or a "payment stablecoin" in the whitepaper settles the legal classification. It does not. Regulators assess the substance of the rights and obligations, not the label. If the whitepaper says "payment stablecoin" but the terms include a yield component, the classification follows the yield, not the label. The expectation of profit created by the yield promise converts the token into a security regardless of what the issuer calls it. In our experience, issuers drafting their first whitepaper routinely underestimate this principle. The assumption is that language controls classification; in practice, economics does.

A second mistake is underestimating the attribution risk of an affiliate structure. Issuers believe that incorporating a yield-offering entity in a lenient offshore jurisdiction and giving it a different name insulates the payment stablecoin from securities classification. It does not if the entities share control, branding, user interface or reserve backing. The legal test is economic reality: does the user perceive a single integrated product? If the answer is yes, the structural separation collapses and the yield obligation taints the entire ecosystem. Operators we advise frequently arrive with a "two-company solution" already built; more than half the time, the separation is cosmetic and does not survive legal analysis.

A third mistake is treating merchant cashback as inherently safe. It is safer than direct issuer-paid interest, but it still carries risk if the cashback is funded by the issuer, accrues over time, or is marketed as a savings feature rather than a transaction promotion. We reviewed a case where a stablecoin issuer partnered with a payment processor to fund cashback rewards for users. The processor paid the rebates, but the issuer reimbursed the processor quarterly from reserve income. The regulator treated the arrangement as issuer-funded yield and commenced an enforcement inquiry. The fact that the payment flowed through an intermediary did not matter; the economic source was the issuer's reserves, and that was enough to trigger the prohibition.

What practical steps should an issuer take before launch?

Start with a written classification assessment that maps the token's features – peg mechanism, reserve composition, redemption rights, and any return or incentive structure – against the Howey factors and the equivalent tests in the target jurisdictions. The assessment should be signed by counsel in each major market where the issuer plans distribution. If the token includes any mechanism that delivers value to the holder over time, model how regulators in the US, the EU, the UK, Singapore and Hong Kong would classify it under their respective frameworks. If the answer diverges – compliant in one hub, non-compliant in another – the issuer must choose between narrowing the distribution geography or restructuring the token to meet the strictest standard.

If the business model requires a return component, separate it cleanly. Create a distinct legal entity for the yield product, domiciled in a jurisdiction with a clear licensing path for that product (a lending licence, an investment-management licence, or securities registration in a responsive forum). Ensure the yield entity holds its own reserves, segregated from the payment stablecoin's reserves, and that users must complete a separate onboarding process to access the yield product. The separation must be real: different branding, different disclosures, different risk warnings. A toggle switch in the same app labeled "Earn" is not sufficient separation if both products are backed by the same pool and managed by the same team.

Third, stress-test the affiliate or third-party structure against economic-reality scrutiny. Ask whether a regulator viewing the arrangement from the outside would conclude that the yield product and the payment stablecoin are a single integrated offering. Indicia of integration include: common ownership, shared reserves, cross-subsidisation, joint marketing, and any representation in public materials that positions the yield product as a feature of the stablecoin rather than as a separate investment. If any of those indicia are present, the issuer should either eliminate them or accept that the structure will be challenged and prepare for securities registration of the entire product suite.

How does the interest ban interact with banking and tax rules?

The interest prohibition sits at the intersection of three regulatory regimes: securities law, banking law, and tax. A stablecoin that pays interest may trigger all three. From a securities perspective, the interest payment creates an expectation-of-profit element that completes the Howey test. From a banking perspective, accepting fiat deposits in exchange for an interest-bearing token looks like deposit-taking, an activity reserved to licensed banks in nearly every major jurisdiction. From a tax perspective, the interest paid to holders is taxable income in the holder's jurisdiction, and the issuer may have withholding or reporting obligations under local tax treaties.

In the United States, a non-bank entity that issues a token and pays interest on it risks dual enforcement: by the SEC as an unregistered securities offering and by the OCC or state banking regulators as unlicensed deposit-taking. The GENIUS Act and STABLE Act both contemplate that a payment-stablecoin issuer must be either a depository institution or a specially chartered non-bank issuer; in either case, the issuer is prohibited from paying interest. If the issuer pays interest anyway, it exits the payment-stablecoin safe harbor and becomes subject to the securities regime, where it is almost certainly unregistered. The dual risk makes the interest ban a hard line for most US issuers.

In the European Union under MiCA, an EMT issuer must be either a credit institution or an authorised EMT issuer under the MiCA regime. Neither may pay interest to tokenholders. If an EU-based issuer attempts to route interest through an offshore affiliate, the arrangement may be challenged as a disguised deposit-taking activity or as a violation of MiCA's prohibition, depending on where the economic substance of the yield product sits. Cross-border structures that involve a US parent, an EU issuer, and an offshore yield entity amplify the enforcement risk because each jurisdiction can assert a basis to regulate the arrangement if local users are involved.

What is the enforcement landscape around stablecoin yield?

Enforcement in the stablecoin space has historically focused on algorithmic stablecoins and outright fraud rather than on the interest-prohibition question, but the enforcement posture is shifting as regulators refine their stablecoin frameworks. The SEC has issued Wells notices to multiple token issuers alleging unregistered securities offerings based on yield-generating features in tokens marketed as payment instruments. Those cases have not all resulted in public litigation, but the notices signal that offering a return on a token triggers securities scrutiny even if the token is labeled as a payment or utility product.

The most visible enforcement pattern involves staking rewards on proof-of-stake tokens that were initially marketed as payment or utility tokens. The SEC's position is that when a token issuer or an affiliate offers staking rewards, the token becomes a security because the rewards constitute profits derived from the efforts of the issuer. That analysis extends to stablecoins: if a stablecoin issuer offers a return tied to holding or staking the stablecoin, the return converts the token into a security. The same economic logic applies whether the return is labeled as staking yield, interest, or rewards. Issuers should expect that the enforcement approach applied to staking will be applied to stablecoin yield structures as stablecoin-specific regulations take effect.

Outside the United States, enforcement has been more muted but is increasing. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and national competent authorities under MiCA have signaled that compliance reviews will include scrutiny of how EMT issuers manage reserve income and whether any portion of that income flows to tokenholders. Singapore's MAS and Hong Kong's SFC have both emphasised in consultation papers that a payment token paying interest would be reclassified and subjected to capital-markets regulation. We have seen no published enforcement actions specifically on stablecoin interest to date in those jurisdictions, but the policy position is clear enough that issuers are restructuring preemptively.

How OBOLUS advises on interest-ban compliance

We assess the token's entire incentive and yield architecture against the classification frameworks in the issuer's target markets – United States (proposed and existing law), European Union (MiCA), United Kingdom (FCA consultation guidance), Singapore (MAS Payment Services Act), and Hong Kong (SFC DPT regime). The assessment includes a written opinion on whether the token as structured would be classified as a security, a deposit product, or a payment instrument in each jurisdiction. If the structure includes affiliate or third-party yield components, we map the control and affiliation indicators that could cause a regulator to impute the yield back to the issuer and collapse the separation.

For issuers who need to offer a return, we design a bifurcated structure: a payment stablecoin that complies with the interest prohibition and a separate investment product that is either registered as a security or offered under an available exemption. That design includes entity formation in appropriate jurisdictions, licensing roadmaps for both products, drafting of separate user terms and risk disclosures, and a compliance protocol to maintain the operational separation over time. The structure is built to withstand economic-reality testing in the jurisdictions where enforcement risk is highest.

We also conduct whitepaper and marketing review to eliminate language that could create an expectation of profit in holders of the payment stablecoin. Ambiguous phrases – "earn with [token name]," "your [token] works for you," "passive income" – all create exposure. The review extends to app interfaces, partnership announcements, and promotional materials. A single careless social-media post describing a yield feature can undo months of structural compliance work by creating a public record of the issuer's intent to deliver a return. That record becomes evidence in an enforcement proceeding. Operators routinely underestimate the legal weight of marketing language; we treat it as part of the compliance perimeter.

To map the classification, structuring and licensing path for your stablecoin, contact OBOLUS at info@oboluslaw.com. We work with issuers across 70+ licensing jurisdictions to build compliant, enforceable token structures that preserve commercial functionality while managing securities and banking risk.

A common assumption is that other stablecoins pay yield, so it must be permissible

The assumption conflates third-party yield with issuer-paid yield. The major fiat-backed stablecoins – USDT, USDC, and others with multi-billion-dollar circulation – do not pay interest to holders. Those tokens are used as collateral or deposited into third-party platforms that pay interest, but the interest is the platform's offering, not the issuer's. The issuer of the stablecoin has no involvement in the yield product. That separation is what keeps the stablecoin itself outside the securities perimeter. A new issuer offering yield directly to holders does not have that separation and cannot rely on the regulatory treatment of established stablecoins as precedent for its own structure.

A second source of confusion is algorithmic stablecoins and DeFi-native tokens that offer "staking" or "yield farming" returns. Those products are not fiat-backed payment stablecoins; they are decentralised finance instruments with entirely different risk and regulatory profiles. Many algorithmic stablecoins have been subject to enforcement actions or have collapsed; they are not a model for compliance. An issuer launching a fiat-backed, redeemable payment stablecoin in 2025 or 2026 is launching into a regulatory environment where the interest prohibition is explicit in proposed legislation and enforcement guidance. The fact that some DeFi protocols or offshore issuers operate outside that framework does not make the practice safe for a regulated issuer targeting institutional or retail distribution in a major hub.

FAQ

Is my token a security under this regime?

If your token pays interest or any return to holders, it is likely classified as a security under the Howey test in the United States and under equivalent frameworks in the EU (MiCA), UK, Singapore and Hong Kong. The analysis turns on whether the token generates an expectation of profit derived from the efforts of the issuer or an affiliate. A payment stablecoin that is redeemable at par, pays no interest, and generates no return for holders is not a security in most jurisdictions. Adding a yield component converts it into a security or a deposit product, both of which require registration or licensing. A classification opinion requires a full review of the token's terms, reserve structure, and distribution model.

Do I need a whitepaper or prospectus?

If the token is classified as a security, you need a prospectus registered with the relevant securities regulator (the SEC in the United States, the competent authority in the EU under MiCA, the FCA in the UK). If the token qualifies as a payment stablecoin and does not pay interest, a whitepaper is typically required under stablecoin-specific frameworks (MiCA for EMTs, the proposed US legislation) but not under securities law. The whitepaper must disclose the peg mechanism, the reserve composition, redemption rights, and the issuer's operational and financial controls. The distinction matters: a prospectus is a securities-law document with liability for misstatements; a stablecoin whitepaper is a disclosure document under the payment-instrument regime, subject to different standards and enforcement mechanisms.

What disclosure is required at launch?

For a payment stablecoin, the required disclosure includes: the nature and composition of the reserves, the redemption mechanism and any fees, the identity and jurisdiction of the issuer and any entities holding reserves, the regulatory status of the issuer, and a clear statement of whether the token pays interest or any return to holders. Under MiCA, an EMT whitepaper must be notified to the regulator before public offering, and the whitepaper must be made available to prospective holders. Under the proposed US legislation, the disclosure obligations are similar, with additional requirements around reserve audits and transparency reports. If the token pays interest and is therefore a security, the disclosure is governed by securities-offering rules and is significantly more extensive, including financial statements, risk factors, use of proceeds, and management background.

About OBOLUS

OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across 70+ jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across 25+ forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the entirety of our practice, and classification, structuring and whitepaper work form the core of our token-issuance service line. Every structure we build is assessed against the enforcement risk in the issuer's target markets, not against theoretical compliance. To discuss your token structure, write to info@oboluslaw.com.

By Roman Levitt, Technology & DeFi Counsel – Mr. Levitt advises on token classification, smart-contract legal enforceability, and the intersection of on-chain and off-chain legal obligations for issuers and protocols operating cross-border.

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Disclaimer

This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.

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