A payments company discovers that $4.8 million in stablecoins has been withdrawn by an unauthorised actor. The forensic report traces the funds through two exchanges, a privacy-enhanced wallet and a liquidity pool before they appear at a third custodian. The question before the court is not whether the trail exists – the blockchain ledger is unambiguous – but whether the legal doctrine of tracing survives the mixing and pooling events along that route. The answer determines whether the victim may assert a proprietary claim to the end-balance, freeze it, and compel disclosure from the intermediaries holding it.
In tracing through pooled and mixed wallets, a court in England & Wales, the DIFC Courts or Singapore applies centuries-old equitable principles to a distributed ledger that records every movement but destroys, by design, the bright line between "your coins" and "mine" the moment value enters a shared address. This article examines the tracing arguments that succeed and fail once digital assets pass through pooled exchange omnibus wallets, mixing services and liquidity pools, and the evidential standard applied to forensic reports that purport to follow value across those events. It is written for general counsel and asset-recovery counsel who must decide, in the hours after a misappropriation, whether a proprietary claim can survive the path the thief has taken.
We address first the common-law tracing framework as applied to crypto assets, then the three pooling scenarios that recur in recovery litigation – the exchange omnibus wallet, the mixing service and the automated market-maker (AMM) pool – before turning to the forensic-evidence threshold courts now impose and the timeline pressures that govern every application. Two anonymised recovery matters illustrate the distinction between a trail that survives mixing and one that does not.
Tracing doctrine and crypto assets: the equitable foundation
Tracing in English law is not a cause of action but an evidential process: it identifies the claimant's original property as it moves through a series of substitutions and mixtures. Where tracing succeeds, the victim may assert a proprietary interest in the traced product – a claim that ranks ahead of unsecured creditors if the recipient is insolvent and that survives good-faith purchase defences where the traced asset itself (rather than its proceeds) is recovered. The leading modern restatement is Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102, which held that tracing follows value, not physical identity, and that commingling does not defeat a claim where the claimant can establish a continuing interest in an identifiable fund.
Digital assets fall within the Foskett framework. In AA v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm), the English Commercial Court confirmed that cryptocurrency is property capable of being held on trust and that tracing principles apply to it. The question is not whether tracing can apply to crypto but whether the facts in a given case permit the claimant to satisfy the two Foskett requirements: that the original asset has been substituted into an identifiable new form, and that the claimant can prove a continuing proprietary link to that new form despite intermediate mixing events.
The difficulty arises because blockchain architecture treats every UTXO (unspent transaction output) or account-model balance as a discrete integer; once two parties' funds share the same address, the protocol itself does not preserve a legal or equitable division between them. A court applying tracing doctrine must therefore decide whether the mixing is innocent (mere commingling in a shared account, which tracing survives) or dissipative (a true mixture that destroys traceability, as when funds are exchanged in a decentralised liquidity pool for a different token). The line between these categories is the central question in every contested crypto tracing case.
The exchange omnibus wallet: innocent commingling or opaque pool?
The omnibus wallet is the most common pooling event in crypto recovery. A centralised exchange receives deposits from thousands of users into a small number of hot wallets and a larger cold-storage reserve. The exchange's internal ledger records each user's balance, but the on-chain addresses themselves hold commingled value. When a victim traces stolen funds to an exchange, the exchange reports only that "address X received Y tokens at timestamp Z"; it does not, without a court order, disclose the beneficial owner of the destination account.
Courts in England & Wales have consistently held that deposit into an exchange omnibus wallet is innocent commingling, not dissipative mixing. The victim's proprietary interest survives because the exchange holds the pooled balance as trustee for its account-holders, and the victim can identify a proportionate share of that pool as representing the traced value. The leading authority is AA v Persons Unknown, in which the court granted a proprietary injunction freezing a sum of bitcoin that had been deposited into a Bitfinex account. The court reasoned that the victim's bitcoin, though commingled with other users' balances in Bitfinex's omnibus wallet, remained identifiable as a proportionate interest in that wallet, and that the exchange held that interest on constructive trust for the ultimate account-holder.
The procedural consequence is significant: a victim who traces misappropriated tokens to an exchange may apply ex parte for a freezing order over the exchange account and, separately, for a Bankers Trust disclosure order compelling the exchange to identify the account-holder. The exchange is joined as a respondent to the disclosure application but is not accused of wrongdoing; it is merely the custodian of a mixed fund in which the victim claims a proprietary share. The orders operate in tandem – the freeze prevents dissipation while the disclosure application proceeds, and the disclosure identifies the defendant for service and substantive recovery proceedings.
In our cross-border practice, we have secured this two-stage relief in England & Wales, the DIFC Courts and Hong Kong. The exchange's cooperation (or resistance) varies by jurisdiction and by the exchange's internal compliance posture. A well-resourced exchange with established legal process typically provides disclosure within 10 to 15 business days of service of the order; a smaller or offshore-domiciled exchange may require enforcement through asset-freezing measures against its banking infrastructure. The critical variable is speed: if the account-holder withdraws the balance before the freeze is served on the exchange, the proprietary claim to that specific pool is lost, and tracing must resume from the withdrawal address.
For a scoped assessment of whether your traced route survives the pooling event and can support a freezing application, contact OBOLUS at info@oboluslaw.com. The analysis turns on the sequence of hops, the forensic provider's identification of the exchange accounts involved, and whether the destination exchange operates in a jurisdiction where provisional relief is available on short notice. We map the procedural path before you commit to the application.
Mixing services and privacy-enhanced wallets: where tracing fails
A true mixing service is designed to break traceability. Services such as Tornado Cash (now sanctioned) and its successors accept deposits of a fixed denomination, pool them with other users' deposits, and allow withdrawal to a fresh address after a time delay and with no on-chain link to the deposit transaction. The mixing is not innocent commingling but a deliberate cryptographic unlinking: the deposit goes into a smart contract that aggregates it with hundreds of other deposits, and the withdrawal emerges from a separate contract event that bears no deterministic connection to any single depositor.
English courts have not yet issued a definitive ruling on whether tracing survives a Tornado Cash deposit, but the academic and practitioner consensus is that it does not. The reason is doctrinal: tracing requires the claimant to identify a continuing interest in an identifiable fund, and a zk-SNARK-based mixer by design renders that identification impossible. The claimant can prove that value entered the mixer and that value of the same denomination later left it, but cannot prove that this withdrawal corresponds to that deposit without breaking the cryptographic anonymity set. For tracing purposes, the mixer is a dissipative event – the original property is exchanged for a new, unconnected output, and the equitable link is severed.
The practical consequence is that a proprietary claim typically terminates at the mixer. The victim retains a personal claim against the thief (if identified) for unjust enrichment or conversion, but loses the ability to assert a proprietary interest in the post-mixer balance. The victim cannot freeze an address that received funds from Tornado Cash on the theory that those funds represent the victim's stolen tokens, because the required causal link cannot be established to the standard the court demands.
Privacy-enhanced wallets such as Wasabi (CoinJoin-based) present a more nuanced picture. A CoinJoin transaction aggregates multiple users' inputs and outputs in a single on-chain transaction, obscuring which input funds which output. The question is whether the aggregation is merely structural (innocent commingling, traceable through probabilistic cluster analysis) or cryptographically dissipative (a true break in the chain). The answer depends on the CoinJoin implementation and on the forensic provider's ability to de-anonymise the transaction through timing analysis, on-chain heuristics and exchange-ingress correlation. Courts in England & Wales have not ruled definitively, but the DIFC Courts in a 2025 matter accepted a forensic report that traced value through a single-round CoinJoin where the report identified a >85% probability that a specific output corresponded to the claimant's input, based on amount-correlation and subsequent clustering.
The evidential threshold is higher after a CoinJoin than after an exchange deposit: the forensic report must not only identify the output address but must also explain the methodology by which it links that output to the claimant's input, and the court will scrutinise the statistical confidence of the conclusion. A report that states "the funds likely moved to address Y" without quantifying "likely" is insufficient. A report that quantifies a 90% posterior probability and discloses its prior assumptions may survive a challenge, but counsel should expect the defendant to file contrary expert evidence attacking the Bayesian model.
DeFi liquidity pools and token swaps: the true break
The most difficult tracing scenario arises when misappropriated tokens are deposited into a decentralised liquidity pool and swapped for a different asset. The victim's USDT, for example, is exchanged through a Uniswap pool for ETH; the ETH is then swapped on another decentralised exchange (DEX) for DAI, and the DAI is withdrawn to a fresh wallet. At each swap, the original token is not merely commingled but is exchanged under an automated market-maker (AMM) algorithm that draws from and returns to a shared liquidity reserve. The swap is an outright substitution, not a custody event, and the reserves themselves are owned collectively by the liquidity providers, not by the pool's users.
Under Foskett, tracing survives a clean exchange (A exchanges pounds for dollars; A's proprietary claim now attaches to the dollars). But tracing through a pool into the pool's reserves fails, because the claimant cannot identify which specific unit of the reserve-asset represents the proceeds of the claimant's swap. The reserve is owned by third-party liquidity providers who have no relationship to the claimant's original property; the swap merely credits the swapper's address with a calculated quantity of the output token, drawn from the aggregate reserve. The Foskett link is broken not by the fact of exchange but by the impossibility of identifying a continuing interest in an asset held beneficially by unconnected third parties.
The result is that a proprietary claim terminates at the first cross-asset DEX swap involving a pooled reserve. The victim may trace the path (USDT → ETH → DAI → destination address) for the purpose of identifying the defendant and demonstrating the movement of value, but may not assert a proprietary interest in the DAI at the destination. The claim converts to a personal restitutionary claim for the value received, which does not support a freezing order absent evidence of dissipation risk under the Chabra jurisdiction.
In practice, defendants use this principle defensively. A defendant who swaps stolen stablecoins for ETH through a Uniswap pool and immediately re-swaps for a different stablecoin will argue that tracing failed at the first swap, that the claimant's proprietary claim is extinguished, and that the subsequent freeze is unsustainable. Claimant counsel must therefore decide at the outset whether the traced route supports a proprietary remedy or only a personal one, and frame the application accordingly. A misjudgement – applying for a proprietary injunction where the route includes a dissipative DEX swap – invites the defendant to apply for discharge of the order on the ground that the underlying cause of action cannot succeed.
Forensic-evidence standards: what the court requires from the expert report
The forensic report is the evidentiary foundation of the tracing claim. The court will not accept counsel's assertion that "the funds moved from address A to address B"; it requires an independent expert report that maps each hop, explains the attribution methodology, identifies the entities operating the intermediate addresses where known, and discloses the level of confidence in each link. The expert is almost always a blockchain-forensics firm (the established providers are Chainalysis, TRM Labs and Elliptic, though smaller regional firms are emerging), and the report must comply with English Civil Procedure Rules Part 35 (or the equivalent in the forum jurisdiction) – it must state the expert's qualifications, confirm that the expert understands their duty to the court, and set out the facts and assumptions on which the opinion rests.
The minimum content for a court-ready forensic report in a contested tracing application includes the originating transaction hash and address, each subsequent transaction in the chain with timestamp and block height, clustering analysis where multiple addresses are attributed to a single entity, identification of exchange deposit addresses and the basis for that identification (e.g., known cold-wallet tagging, exchange-published addresses, or prior transaction patterns), quantified confidence intervals for probabilistic links, and a clear statement of any hops that cannot be traced beyond reasonable doubt. A report that omits intermediate steps or that elides a CoinJoin with the phrase "funds moved through a mixer" will not survive cross-examination.
The second evidentiary threshold is temporal: the report must be current. A tracing report prepared three weeks after the misappropriation may identify the path accurately, but if the destination balance has since been withdrawn, the court will discharge a proprietary freezing order because the res no longer exists at the frozen address. We advise clients to instruct forensics within 24 hours of discovering the misappropriation and to update the trace daily until the balance stabilises. The updated report forms an exhibit to the application, and we include in the draft order a provision requiring the forensic provider to notify the court and the parties immediately if the traced balance moves after the order is granted.
If a recovery clock is running, reach our disputes desk now at info@oboluslaw.com. We coordinate the forensic instruction, draft the without-notice application and liaise with the exchange or custodian holding the destination balance, all within the window required to freeze the funds before they move again. The entire sequence from misappropriation to served freeze order can be compressed into 48 to 72 hours where the forum and the facts permit urgent relief.
Jurisdictional variations: England, DIFC, Singapore, Hong Kong
The substantive tracing principles outlined above derive from English equity, but the four leading common-law forums for crypto asset recovery – England & Wales, the DIFC Courts, Singapore and Hong Kong – each apply them with procedural variations that affect the timeline and the prospects of success.
England & Wales remains the forum of choice for high-value recoveries where the defendant's location is unknown. The worldwide freezing order (an injunction freezing a defendant's assets globally, formerly known as a Mareva injunction) is available on an ex parte basis where there is a real risk of dissipation, and the court has repeatedly affirmed that crypto assets held on an exchange account are subject to such orders. The freeze is coupled with Bankers Trust disclosure (compelling an exchange to identify the account-holder) and, where appropriate, Norwich Pharmacal disclosure (compelling an intermediary to identify a wrongdoer). The procedural innovation in crypto cases is that these applications are now routinely granted on very short notice – 24 to 48 hours from instruction to ex parte hearing – where the evidence shows that the traced balance is still at the identified address.
The DIFC Courts offer a similar suite of remedies with the added benefit of an English-language common-law forum inside the UAE. In Techteryx v Aria Commodities DMCC [2025] DIFC, the court granted a worldwide freezing order in support of arbitration proceedings seated outside the DIFC, holding that the DIFC Courts Act confers jurisdiction to grant provisional relief even where the substantive dispute is not within the DIFC. The court has also accepted Chainalysis and Elliptic reports as expert evidence in contested asset-tracing applications. The DIFC's advantage is speed: the ex parte applications desk operates on a 24-hour turnaround for urgent relief, and the court has shown itself comfortable with the technical detail of on-chain tracing.
Singapore and Hong Kong both recognise proprietary injunctions over crypto assets, but their without-notice procedure is more cautious. In Singapore, CLM v CLN [2022] SGHC 46 confirmed that a proprietary injunction may freeze cryptocurrency held by a defendant, but the court emphasised that the claimant must demonstrate a proprietary interest at the time of the application – a post-swap balance held after a DEX trade will not support the injunction unless the swap itself is voidable. Hong Kong issued the first tokenised freezing order in 2024 (HCA 2417/2024), embedding an NFT into the order itself to signal on-chain that the address was under judicial restraint, though the order's enforceability outside Hong Kong remains untested.
The cross-border recovery practice therefore proceeds forum-first: we identify which court can grant effective relief over the balance as it currently sits, confirm that the traced route satisfies that forum's tracing standard, and file in that jurisdiction. Where the defendant or the exchange operates across multiple forums, we may file concurrent or sequential applications (a freeze in England to restrain the defendant's worldwide assets, followed by disclosure proceedings in Singapore to identify co-conspirators banking there). The multi-forum approach is resource-intensive but is increasingly the norm in cases involving exchange-held balances over $1 million equivalent.
Two anonymised recovery matters: trails that held and trails that broke
In a late-2024 matter, a custody provider traced $2.3 million in misappropriated USDC through three on-chain hops to a deposit address at a European exchange. The forensic report identified the deposit transaction, matched the exchange's published cold-wallet addresses and quantified the time between misappropriation and deposit at 14 hours. We filed an ex parte application in England & Wales for a proprietary injunction and Bankers Trust disclosure within 36 hours of the misappropriation. The court granted both orders, the exchange disclosed the account-holder (an entity in a CIS jurisdiction), and we served the freezing order on the exchange before the defendant attempted withdrawal. The balance was frozen; the defendant did not appear to contest, and the matter settled three months later for return of 90% of the traced sum plus costs. The tracing succeeded because the only pooling event was the exchange omnibus wallet, an innocent commingling that preserved the proprietary claim under AA v Persons Unknown.
In a contrasting matter from early 2025, a token issuer traced 800 ETH stolen from a multi-signature wallet. The forensic report showed the ETH moving to a decentralised exchange, swapped for USDT through a Uniswap V3 pool, then sent to a mixing service and finally withdrawn to an address that deposited into a Cayman-licensed exchange. We advised the client that the proprietary claim failed at the Uniswap swap: the ETH was exchanged into a pooled reserve owned by liquidity providers with no connection to the victim, and the USDT that emerged was a new asset, not a traceable proceed. The client elected not to pursue a proprietary freezing application, and instead negotiated directly with the Cayman exchange (which had KYC on the account-holder) for a voluntary freeze pending a settlement discussion. The matter resolved without contested litigation, but with a significantly reduced recovery percentage because the claim was personal, not proprietary, and the defendant held no other reachable assets.
The distinction between these two matters is the distinction at the heart of crypto tracing: a pooling event that preserves equitable ownership (the exchange omnibus wallet) versus a substitution event that extinguishes it (the DEX swap into a reserve pool). The forensic trail in both cases was complete – we knew where the assets went – but only the first trail supported a proprietary remedy.
Practical obstacles and limitations: speed, cost and evidential gaps
The procedural map above describes the law as applied in optimal conditions. In practice, three obstacles recur. The first is speed. A misappropriation discovered on a Friday evening leaves the victim 60 hours until the courts reopen on Monday morning; if the thief withdraws the balance over the weekend, the freeze application becomes moot. Some exchanges operate 24-hour fraud desks that will impose a voluntary compliance hold on an account flagged by a law-enforcement or regulatory contact, but most do not, and a private victim has no mechanism to compel a weekend freeze absent a duty judge willing to hear an urgent ex parte application out of hours. The DIFC Courts and England & Wales both maintain emergency-application procedures, but they require the applicant to demonstrate that the delay until the next business day would cause irreparable harm – a threshold met where forensics show that the defendant has been moving funds hourly.
The second obstacle is cost. The combined outlay for forensics, English counsel, a ex parte application and the first round of disclosure typically runs into the low six figures. Smaller victims (a stolen balance under $500,000) may find the cost-benefit unattractive unless the defendant holds other assets or unless recovery is a reputational necessity. The structured fixed-fee packages we offer are designed to give certainty at the outset – the client knows the cost of the freeze-and-disclosure phase before committing – but the economic calculus remains that crypto recovery is worthwhile for balances above a threshold, and prohibitive below it.
The third obstacle is the evidential gap. Not every on-chain hop is attributable to a known entity. A withdrawal from an exchange to an address controlled by the defendant is straightforward; a withdrawal from an exchange to an address that subsequently transacts with 50 other addresses in a rapid cascade is not. Forensics can follow the chain, but if the end address is a fresh wallet with no prior transaction history and no off-chain identification vector (no exchange deposit, no ENS domain, no IP log from a service the victim controls), the Bankers Trust disclosure has no target, and the freeze operates only against "persons unknown". The freeze may prevent the defendant from moving the balance, but it does not, alone, reveal who the defendant is or provide a means to serve substantive proceedings. The result is a stalemate: the funds are frozen, but the victim cannot proceed to judgment without identifying a defendant capable of being served.
A common assumption: that the exchange will cooperate voluntarily
A recurring misconception among victims is that an exchange, presented with a forensic report showing misappropriated funds in one of its accounts, will freeze the account and disclose the holder as a matter of policy. It will not. An exchange is a custodian, not a law-enforcement body, and absent a court order or a regulatory direction, it has no legal basis to freeze a customer's account or to breach that customer's data-privacy rights by disclosing their identity to a third party. An exchange that freezes without legal process exposes itself to a claim by the account-holder for wrongful interference with the account; an exchange that discloses without legal process breaches data-protection law in its own jurisdiction and potentially violates its custody agreement with the customer.
The legal route is therefore mandatory: the victim must apply to a court for a freezing order served on the exchange (to restrain the account) and a disclosure order requiring the exchange to identify the account-holder. Both applications are adversarial in form – the exchange is the respondent to the disclosure application, though it typically does not oppose if the order is narrowly drafted and indemnifies the exchange for costs. The timeline from application to disclosure is measured in weeks, not days, and the exchange will not act until it has received served, sealed orders and has had the opportunity to take its own legal advice. A victim who bypasses this process and approaches the exchange directly achieves nothing except to alert the defendant (if the exchange forwards the inquiry) that the victim is tracing the funds.
Self-assessment: does your situation support a tracing claim?
Before instructing counsel on a recovery application, a general counsel or CFO can perform a preliminary assessment using four decision points. First, timeline: was the misappropriation discovered within 72 hours, and is the traced balance still at the identified address? If the answer is no, a proprietary freeze is unlikely to succeed, and the focus shifts to a personal claim. Second, route: does the forensic trail pass through an exchange omnibus wallet only, or does it include a DEX swap, a mixer or a CoinJoin? If the latter, the proprietary claim is weak unless the report quantifies traceability through the mixing event at a confidence level above 85%. Third, destination: is the end address an account at an exchange that operates in a jurisdiction where provisional relief is available (England, DIFC, Singapore, Hong Kong, BVI, Cayman)? If the exchange is unregulated or domiciled in a non-reciprocating jurisdiction, the freeze may be granted but will be unenforceable. Fourth, value: does the stolen sum justify the cost of a contested multi-forum recovery? The breakeven for a standard freeze-and-disclosure sequence is typically in the region of $750,000 equivalent, accounting for legal fees, forensics, court fees and the risk that the defendant dissipates other assets during the freeze.
Where the answer to all four is yes, the matter should be in front of recovery counsel within 24 hours of the misappropriation. Where one or more answers is no, the client may still have a personal claim for unjust enrichment or conversion, but the procedural route and the cost-benefit calculation change materially.
To pressure-test your tracing route and map the procedural options across the relevant forums, write to us at info@oboluslaw.com. We deliver an initial strategy call under NDA at no charge, and if a recovery action is viable, we quote a fixed fee for the freeze-and-disclosure phase so you can weigh cost against recoverable value before committing. The consultation compresses the decision from weeks to days and gives your board the information it needs to authorise the application while the recovery window is still open.
Related at OBOLUS
- Disputes & Asset Recovery for Digital-Asset Businesses – proprietary injunctions, exchange disclosure and cross-border enforcement for operators and institutional victims.
- Protocol Developer Liability: Sanctions, Code and Criminal Exposure – the liability boundary for DeFi builders and where tracing obligations attach to protocol operators.
- Creditor Claim in Crypto Insolvency in Switzerland – establishing a proprietary claim in the Swiss restructuring context after a custodian or exchange fails.
FAQ
Can stolen crypto actually be recovered?
Yes, where the misappropriation is discovered quickly and the funds remain at an identifiable address. Recovery depends on three conditions: a complete forensic trace to the current address, a legal route in the forum where that address sits (typically a proprietary freezing order and a disclosure order against the custodian holding the address), and speed – the recovery window is measured in hours to days, not weeks. Proprietary claims succeed most often where the funds passed only through exchange wallets before reaching the destination; claims that involve DEX swaps or mixing services face higher evidential and legal obstacles. In our cross-border practice, we have secured freezing relief and exchange disclosure in England & Wales, the DIFC Courts and Singapore, typically within 72 hours of the misappropriation where the facts support urgent relief.
How fast must I act after a digital-asset theft?
The critical window is 24 to 72 hours. Blockchain forensics can be instructed and completed within 12 to 24 hours for a standard multi-hop trace, and a without-notice freezing application in England & Wales or the DIFC Courts can be drafted and heard within a further 24 to 48 hours if the evidence demonstrates that the balance is at immediate risk of dissipation. If the stolen balance moves from the address identified in the forensic report before the freeze is served on the custodian, the proprietary claim to that specific pool is lost and tracing must resume from the new address. We advise clients to instruct counsel the same business day the misappropriation is discovered, so that forensics and the application proceed in parallel and the freeze reaches the exchange before the defendant acts.
Can a court freeze assets held on an exchange?
Yes. Courts in England & Wales, the DIFC, Singapore and Hong Kong routinely grant proprietary injunctions freezing cryptocurrency held in an account at a centralised exchange. The legal basis is that the exchange holds the funds as trustee for its account-holders and that a victim who traces misappropriated funds to an exchange account holds a proportionate proprietary interest in the commingled pool. The freeze order is served on the exchange, which is required to prevent withdrawal from the specified account. A separate disclosure order (a Bankers Trust order in England & Wales) compels the exchange to identify the account-holder, converting a claim against "persons unknown" into a claim against a named defendant. The exchange itself is not a defendant to the substantive claim; it is merely the custodian holding the asset under judicial restraint.
About OBOLUS
OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across 70+ jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across 25+ forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the whole of our practice. Our disputes team coordinates freezing relief and on-chain tracing across leading common-law forums – we move for provisional relief while the recovery clock is running and we deliver the strategy call and the fixed-fee quote for the freeze-and-disclosure sequence within 24 hours of instruction. To discuss your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.
By Glen Sorensen, Disputes & Recovery Analyst – Glen specialises in proprietary claims, cross-border freezing relief and forensic-evidence admissibility in crypto asset-recovery litigation.
This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.