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Protocol Developer Liability: Sanctions, Code and Criminal Exposure

Protocol Developer Liability: Sanctions, Code and Criminal Exposure. Independent digital-asset law for exchanges, issuers and funds. Cross-border scope, fixed-f

A protocol developer publishes open-source code that implements a decentralised exchange. Three years later, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designates the protocol as a sanctions target, asserting that the developer "facilitated" transactions for designated persons. The developer never operated a node, never held user funds, never charged a fee. The question of whether publishing neutral code creates criminal liability, money-transmission exposure or civil asset-recovery risk is now before courts and regulators in the United States and the European Union, and the answer turns on where the line falls between speech and service.

This analysis examines the developing boundaries of protocol developer liability across three risk vectors: sanctions designation and its reversal, money-transmission licensing theories under the Bank Secrecy Act and state regimes, and criminal exposure under money-laundering and conspiracy doctrines. For businesses deploying or advising on decentralised protocols, the practical question is not whether the code is neutral – it is whether the developer's conduct around the code crosses into operation, facilitation or control sufficient to impose liability under regimes written for intermediaries. In our cross-border disputes practice, we see operators grappling with this line in real time: structuring contributions to avoid control, geographic filtering to manage sanctions risk, and pre-litigation strategy where a designation is threatened or already in place.

The Tornado Cash designation and its reversal

On August 8, 2022, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Tornado Cash – a set of Ethereum smart contracts implementing a privacy protocol – under the authority of Executive Order 13694, asserting that the protocol had been used to launder proceeds of the Lazarus Group's cyber heists. The designation listed forty-five Ethereum addresses corresponding to the deployed contracts and asserted that Tornado Cash had facilitated more than seven billion dollars in transactions since 2019, including hundreds of millions tied to designated actors.

The designation was novel: OFAC had never before sanctioned lines of code. It raised an immediate legal and operational controversy. Developers and users challenged the designation in Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury (N.D. Tex.), arguing that the immutable smart contracts were not "property" within the meaning of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, that the developers had no continuing control over the deployed code, and that the designation violated the First Amendment by restricting the publication and use of expressive code. In a significant development, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in a decision issued in late 2024 that OFAC had exceeded its statutory authority: the deployed Tornado Cash contracts were not "property" of a foreign national and could not be blocked under IEEPA. The appellate court found that the immutable contracts, once deployed, were not owned or controlled by any person – they were autonomous code executing according to their programmed logic, accessible to any Ethereum user without permission. The designation was vacated as to the deployed contracts.

The reversal clarifies the sanctions boundary for immutable, non-custodial protocols: code that cannot be altered or shut down by its developers and that does not vest control over user assets in any person is unlikely to constitute blockable property. But the Fifth Circuit's reasoning does not immunise developers from all sanctions risk. The court's analysis turned on the absence of continuing control once the contracts were deployed. Where a protocol's governance retains the ability to pause, upgrade or censor transactions – or where the developer operates ancillary services such as a frontend, a relayer network or a fee-extraction mechanism – the calculus shifts. OFAC has signalled that it views such structures as potentially designatable under its existing authority, and the Tornado Cash prosecution in the Southern District of New York proceeds on parallel criminal theories that do not depend on the civil sanctions designation.

For businesses building or funding decentralised protocols, the practical takeaway is structural. Immutability and non-custody reduce but do not eliminate sanctions risk. A protocol that retains governance control over a pause function, that collects fees into a developer-controlled address, or that operates a user-facing service layer alongside the contracts creates an operational nexus that may support a designation – or a criminal facilitation theory – even if the underlying code is open-source. In a recent advisory engagement, we worked with a DeFi team planning a privacy-layer protocol to model governance structures that would preserve upgradeability for security patches while eliminating the developer's ability to censor or reverse user transactions, thereby reducing the risk that the protocol would later be characterised as a service under the developer's control.

Money-transmission theories and the BSA

The Bank Secrecy Act defines a money transmitter as any person engaged in the business of accepting currency or funds and transmitting them to another location or person. FinCEN's 2013 guidance on virtual currencies extended the definition to cover exchangers and administrators of convertible virtual currencies, and the agency's subsequent interpretive letters have asserted that certain decentralised-protocol operators fall within the definition. The question that remains contested is whether a developer who publishes protocol code – but who does not operate nodes, does not hold user keys, does not execute transactions and does not collect fees tied to individual transfers – is "engaged in the business" of transmission.

The federal position, articulated in FinCEN guidance and in prosecutions, is that operation or control is the triggering factor, not custody. In the Harmon prosecution (D.D.C., 2020), the government successfully argued that the operator of a bitcoin-laundering service built atop a decentralised mixing protocol was a money transmitter because he facilitated the transfers, controlled the mixing flow, and profited from the service – even though he never took custody in the traditional banking sense. The court found that the defendant's control over the service flow and his commercial facilitation satisfied the "engaged in the business" standard. The same theory underpins the ongoing prosecution in the Tornado Cash matter: the indictment alleges that the developers operated the protocol by deploying governance contracts, by promoting its use, and by deriving economic benefit from the protocol's token, thereby crossing from code publication into service operation.

State money-transmitter licensing regimes, which operate in parallel to the federal BSA, adopt varied approaches. New York's BitLicense regulation explicitly covers transmission and exchange; Texas and other states apply a "control" test that focuses on whether the person has unilateral authority over the movement of funds. For protocol developers, the variance creates a patchwork risk: even if federal authorities decline to assert jurisdiction, a state regulator may take the position that facilitating the protocol's deployment or operating ancillary infrastructure constitutes unlicensed money transmission under state law.

The line is not bright. Publishing code on GitHub and walking away is the lowest-risk posture. Operating a user-facing website that routes transactions through the protocol, collecting protocol fees, or maintaining governance control over contract parameters moves the developer closer to the "engaged in the business" threshold. A developer who markets the protocol, provides user support, or runs infrastructure that routes transaction flow faces materially higher licensing and enforcement risk, even if the underlying contracts are non-custodial.

In structuring protocol contributions, businesses we advise routinely separate core-contract deployment from service-layer operation. The deployment of immutable contracts is performed by a developer entity or DAO that retains no operational role. Any user-facing frontend, API, or relayer network is then operated by a distinct entity, domiciled in a licensing-friendly jurisdiction, which holds the required money-transmitter or VASP licence and implements the appropriate AML controls. This separation does not eliminate risk entirely – prosecutors may still argue that the entities are alter egos or that the deployment was itself a facilitative act – but it structures the arrangement to align with the control-based theories that courts and regulators have applied to date.

Criminal exposure under money-laundering statutes

Beyond sanctions and licensing risk, protocol developers face potential criminal liability under federal money-laundering statutes, conspiracy theories, and aiding-and-abetting doctrines. The core federal money-laundering offences – 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (laundering) and § 1957 (engaging in monetary transactions with criminal proceeds) – require proof that the defendant conducted a financial transaction with the knowledge that the property involved represented proceeds of specified unlawful activity. The question for a protocol developer is whether deploying or maintaining code that is later used to launder funds satisfies the knowledge and conduct elements, and whether the developer's role constitutes "conducting" a transaction within the meaning of the statute.

The Tornado Cash indictment offers the government's current theory. The charges allege that the developers conspired to operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business and to launder funds, and that they aided and abetted sanctions violations, based on allegations that they knew the protocol was being used by designated actors, that they took steps to facilitate that use (including deploying the governance token and promoting the protocol's privacy features), and that they derived financial benefit from the protocol's growth. The indictment does not allege that the defendants held custody of user funds or executed individual transactions. The theory is that the defendants' role in creating, promoting and economically benefiting from a tool that they knew was being used for illicit purposes satisfies the aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy standards, and that the operation of the protocol – through governance and promotion – constituted the operation of a money-transmitting business.

The legal test for aiding and abetting under federal law requires proof that the defendant (1) knew that the principal was committing or intended to commit a crime, and (2) took an affirmative act to facilitate that crime with the intent to facilitate it. For conspiracy, the government must prove an agreement to commit the unlawful act and an overt act in furtherance. The Tornado Cash theory extends both doctrines to a developer who published neutral code but who, the government alleges, knew that the code was being used for laundering and who promoted that use to drive protocol adoption and token value. If the theory prevails, it would establish that a developer's knowledge of illicit use, combined with affirmative promotional conduct and financial benefit, can satisfy the facilitation and intent elements – even in the absence of custody or transaction-level control.

The defence argument is that code is speech, that the developers published a neutral tool with lawful as well as unlawful uses, and that knowledge of potential misuse does not convert code publication into criminal facilitation. The outcome will turn on whether the jury finds that the defendants' promotional activities and governance role crossed the line from passive publication into active facilitation – a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the specific conduct alleged.

For protocol teams, the criminal-risk mitigation strategy is threefold: limit governance control, document legitimate-use rationale, and avoid promotional conduct that appears to target or facilitate illicit actors. A protocol marketed as "untraceable" or "sanction-resistant," with promotional materials that highlight evasion of law-enforcement scrutiny, presents a materially higher risk profile than a protocol marketed for privacy against commercial surveillance, with documentation of lawful use cases and voluntary cooperation with law-enforcement requests where technically feasible. In a recent matter, we advised a DeFi platform that had deployed a privacy mixer to scrub all promotional language referencing evasion or regulatory arbitrage, to publish a clear acceptable-use policy prohibiting use by sanctioned persons, and to implement frontend geographic blocking for OFAC-sanctioned jurisdictions – steps that, while not eliminating criminal risk, reduce the evidentiary basis for a knowledge-and-intent case should the protocol later be misused.

Jurisdiction and extraterritorial reach

Protocol developers outside the United States are not immune from U.S. enforcement. The Department of Justice asserts jurisdiction over foreign nationals where the conduct has a substantial effect in the United States or where the defendant used U.S. financial infrastructure, even indirectly. In the Tornado Cash case, one of the charged developers is a Dutch national who resided in the Netherlands at the time of the alleged conduct. The indictment asserts jurisdiction on the basis that the protocol facilitated transactions involving U.S. persons and U.S. exchanges, and that the defendants used U.S.-based services to promote the protocol.

For developers sitting outside the U.S., the jurisdictional question is not whether the code is hosted on a U.S. server or whether the developer has a U.S. presence – it is whether the protocol's use by U.S. persons or its interaction with U.S. exchanges creates a sufficient nexus for criminal jurisdiction. Under the effects test articulated in cases such as United States v. Ivanov (D. Conn., 2001) and applied in cyber-crime prosecutions, jurisdiction exists where the defendant's conduct was intended to cause – and did cause – harm within the United States, even if the defendant never set foot in the country. A protocol that is used to launder proceeds from a hack of a U.S. exchange, or that is marketed to U.S. users, may support U.S. jurisdiction over a foreign developer under this theory.

Extradition is the enforcement mechanism. The U.S. maintains extradition treaties with most developed jurisdictions, and prosecutors routinely seek extradition of foreign nationals charged with cyber crimes and financial fraud. For a developer in the EU, the relevant question is whether the alleged conduct constitutes an extraditable offence under the treaty and under the law of the requested state. Money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering are generally extraditable offences; the defence would turn on whether the conduct – code publication and promotion – satisfies the dual-criminality requirement and whether the extradition would be blocked on free-speech or political-offence grounds. To date, no EU member state has refused extradition on First Amendment-equivalent grounds in a crypto-developer case, but the issue is being litigated in the Netherlands in parallel proceedings related to the Tornado Cash matter.

For non-U.S. developers, the practical mitigation is geographic scope management. Structuring the protocol to block U.S. IP addresses at the frontend level, implementing KYC at any service layer, and avoiding marketing to U.S. users reduces (but does not eliminate) the jurisdictional nexus. If the protocol's use by U.S. persons is technically unavoidable – because the contracts are deployed on a public blockchain accessible worldwide – the residual risk is that a U.S. prosecutor will assert effects-based jurisdiction if the protocol is later used in a significant U.S.-connected crime. In such cases, the developer's best defence is the absence of control: if the developer deployed immutable contracts and retained no ability to censor or reverse transactions, the argument that the developer "operated" the protocol becomes materially harder to sustain.

Civil liability and asset recovery claims

Beyond criminal and regulatory exposure, protocol developers face potential civil liability from victims of fraud or theft who allege that the protocol facilitated the misappropriation or laundering of their assets. The theory, advanced in several ongoing cases in U.S. courts, is that the developer is liable for conversion, aiding and abetting fraud, or unjust enrichment where the protocol was used as the vehicle for moving or obscuring stolen funds. The plaintiff's burden is to prove that the developer exercised sufficient control over the protocol to constitute a facilitator of the underlying wrong, and that the developer's conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss.

The leading case on protocol-developer civil liability is still developing. In Ooki DAO (N.D. Cal., 2023), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission successfully argued that a decentralised autonomous organisation that governed a DeFi protocol could be held liable for operating an unregistered derivatives platform, based on the DAO's governance control over protocol parameters and its collection of protocol fees. The case was not a private asset-recovery action, but the theory – that governance control over a protocol, even if distributed among token holders, constitutes sufficient operation to impose liability – has been cited in subsequent private lawsuits seeking to hold protocol developers liable for losses caused by protocol misuse.

In the asset-recovery context, the plaintiff's challenge is identifying a solvent defendant with a connection to the harm. Where the protocol is non-custodial and immutable, the developer typically does not hold the stolen funds and cannot reverse the transaction. The recovery theory must therefore be indirect: a claim for the value of assets lost, based on the developer's alleged facilitation, or a tracing claim that follows the stolen funds to a point where they are held by a person who did exercise control – typically an exchange or a mixing-service operator. The developer's liability, if any, would be for damages, not for return of the specific assets.

For developers, the civil-liability risk is most acute where the protocol collects fees or where the developer holds governance tokens that appreciate in value as the protocol is used. A plaintiff can argue that the developer benefited economically from facilitating the illicit transaction and should disgorge that benefit. The argument is weaker where the developer deployed the code for no fee, retains no governance control, and holds no economic interest in the protocol's use. Even so, the cost of defending a civil claim – particularly in a U.S. jurisdiction where discovery is broad and the plaintiff has a sympathetic fact pattern – can be substantial, and the reputational damage of being named as a defendant in a high-profile fraud case can foreclose future opportunities.

Structuring contributions to limit exposure

The common thread across sanctions, licensing, criminal and civil theories is the question of control. A developer who retains the ability to pause, censor or upgrade a protocol, who collects fees from its operation, who markets the protocol to users, or who provides operational infrastructure that routes transaction flow is likelier to be characterised as operating a service than a developer who publishes code and walks away. The distinction is not always clean – prosecutors and regulators have broad discretion to characterise conduct, and courts apply multi-factor tests that weigh the totality of circumstances – but the structural choices a developer makes materially affect the risk profile.

The lowest-risk structure is immutability plus non-custody. Deploy the contracts with no upgrade mechanism, no pause function, and no admin key. Retain no ability to censor transactions or to alter protocol parameters. Collect no fees into a developer-controlled address. Avoid operating a frontend or relayer service; if a frontend is necessary for user adoption, operate it through a separate licensed entity in a clear jurisdiction. Document the immutability and the absence of control in public communications, and preserve evidence that the deployment was a one-time act with no ongoing operational role.

Where upgradeability is necessary for security or feature development, the risk-mitigation approach is to vest upgrade authority in a DAO or multi-signature council with no individual or entity holding unilateral control, to time-lock upgrades with a public notice period, and to limit the scope of upgradeable parameters to technical maintenance rather than censorship or transaction reversal. This structure does not eliminate the risk that a regulator will assert that the DAO operates the protocol, but it reduces the risk that any individual developer will be held personally liable as the operator.

For protocols that collect fees – common in DeFi, where protocol revenue funds development or is distributed to token holders – the mitigation is to route fees to a DAO treasury governed by tokenholders, rather than to a developer entity, and to implement those distributions on-chain through transparent smart contracts. If fees flow to a developer-controlled entity, the developer is exposed to the argument that the protocol is a for-profit service operated for the developer's benefit. If fees flow to a DAO treasury or are burned, the developer's economic interest is indirect, and the "engaged in the business" analysis weakens.

Geographic filtering at the frontend level is now standard practice for protocols seeking to reduce U.S. enforcement risk. Blocking U.S. IP addresses, implementing wallet-address screening against OFAC lists, and publishing an acceptable-use policy prohibiting use by sanctioned persons create an evidentiary record that the developer took steps to prevent illicit use. These measures are not technically effective – a sanctioned user can access the contracts directly on-chain or through a VPN – but they demonstrate good-faith compliance effort and reduce the risk that a prosecutor will argue that the developer knowingly facilitated sanctions evasion.

The cross-border dimension: EU and UK positions

The European Union's approach to protocol-developer liability differs in important respects from the U.S. position. Under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), which applies from December 2024 for stablecoins and from mid-2025 for other crypto-assets, the regulated activity is the provision of a crypto-asset service to third parties on a professional basis. The definition of service provider is narrower than the U.S. money-transmitter concept: it focuses on entities that provide custody, operate a trading platform, or offer exchange or placement services. A developer who deploys a protocol but who does not provide a service directly to users is, under a plain reading of MiCA, not a service provider and not subject to authorisation.

The practical uncertainty arises from national implementation. MiCA delegates supervision to national competent authorities, and member states retain discretion to apply their own AML regimes in parallel. Some NCAs – particularly those in jurisdictions historically strict on financial regulation – have signalled that they will interpret "provision of a service" broadly to capture developers who market or promote a protocol, even if they do not hold user assets. The Netherlands' prosecution of a Tornado Cash developer under money-laundering and sanctions charges, while based on Dutch criminal law rather than MiCA, reflects this broader interpretive approach.

The United Kingdom, which is not subject to MiCA, applies a principles-based regime under the Financial Conduct Authority. Cryptoasset service providers must register under the Money Laundering Regulations; certain activities may require authorisation if they constitute a regulated financial activity. The FCA has stated in guidance that it views control as the key factor: a person who exercises control over user assets, or who operates infrastructure that intermediates transactions, is likelier to fall within the regulatory perimeter than a person who publishes code. The FCA has not to date pursued an enforcement action against a pure protocol developer, but the agency has indicated in consultation papers that it is considering how to address DeFi protocols under its evolving framework.

For developers operating from or marketing into the EU or UK, the mitigation strategy is jurisdictional arbitrage and structural clarity. Deploy the protocol from a jurisdiction with a clear safe-harbour for non-custodial code (Switzerland's fintech-sandbox approach is often cited as developer-friendly). If a service layer is necessary, operate it through a licensed entity in an EU member state that has adopted a narrow interpretation of the MiCA service-provider definition, or in the UK under FCA registration. Document the separation between code deployment and service operation, and ensure that promotional materials do not blur the line by suggesting that the developer operates the protocol on behalf of users.

When to engage counsel: pre-designation and investigation

The optimal time to engage disputes counsel on protocol-liability risk is before enforcement action is imminent – at the design stage, when structural choices can still reduce exposure. Once a sanctions designation is issued, a prosecution is filed, or a civil claim is served, the developer's options narrow to defence and mitigation; the opportunity to structure out of the risk has passed. In our practice, we see three common scenarios where early advice materially changes the outcome.

The first is pre-deployment structural review. A DeFi team planning to launch a privacy protocol, a decentralised exchange, or a lending market engages counsel to model governance structures, fee flows, and service-layer separation. The review identifies features that would create licensing, sanctions or criminal risk under the applicable regimes, and the team redesigns the architecture before deployment. The typical issues are pause functions that vest unilateral control in a developer multi-sig, fee structures that route revenue to a developer entity, and marketing language that highlights regulatory arbitrage. The cost of the review is a fraction of the cost of later defending an enforcement action, and the structural fixes are straightforward when implemented at the design stage.

The second is pre-enforcement engagement with regulators. A protocol has launched, usage is growing, and the team receives informal signals that a regulator is reviewing the project – inquiries from an NCA, a request from an exchange to explain the protocol's AML posture, or a subpoena to a service provider. At this stage, the team can still engage the regulator proactively, explain the protocol's non-custodial and immutable design, and in some cases negotiate a framework for compliance (such as frontend geographic filtering or voluntary cooperation with law-enforcement tracing requests) that forestalls a formal enforcement action. The engagement must be careful – any statement to a regulator can later be used in a prosecution – but a well-structured dialogue, led by experienced counsel, can resolve regulatory concerns before they escalate.

The third is designation-challenge strategy. A protocol or developer has been designated by OFAC or another sanctions authority, or a prosecution has been filed. The immediate question is whether to challenge the designation in court, as the Tornado Cash plaintiffs did, or to negotiate a settlement. The choice depends on the facts – the strength of the control-and-property arguments, the forum, the client's risk tolerance, and the collateral consequences of remaining designated. A successful challenge can vindicate the developer's position and create favourable precedent; a failed challenge consumes resources and may result in an adverse ruling that forecloses future defences. In the Tornado Cash matter, the plaintiffs' challenge succeeded on appeal, but the litigation took more than two years and the criminal case against the developers proceeds in parallel. For a developer with fewer resources or a weaker factual posture, the calculus may favour settlement or deactivation rather than litigation.

If enforcement action is already in motion, contact OBOLUS disputes counsel immediately. The first seventy-two hours after a designation or an indictment are critical for securing the client's operational continuity – preserving access to financial services, protecting privileged communications, and coordinating with any co-defendants or co-investors who may be affected by the action. Delays at this stage compound the downstream cost.

Objection handler: "We are just publishing code"

A common assumption among protocol developers is that publishing code – even code that is later used for illicit purposes – is protected activity under principles of free speech and cannot form the basis of criminal or regulatory liability. The assumption is that code is expression, not conduct, and that liability for publishing neutral tools would chill legitimate innovation. That assumption is no longer safe.

The current enforcement and litigation landscape reflects a narrower view: code publication is protected when it is passive dissemination of information, but it loses that protection when the developer's conduct crosses into operation, promotion or economic benefit. The Tornado Cash prosecution and the Fifth Circuit's partial reversal of the designation illustrate the distinction. The appellate court held that the immutable deployed contracts were not blockable property, but it did not hold that the developers were immune from liability; the criminal case proceeds on theories that the developers operated the protocol through governance, promotion and fee collection, not on the theory that they merely published code.

For businesses, the practical reality is that "we just published code" is a defence that succeeds only when the facts support it. If the developer deployed immutable contracts, retained no control, collected no fees, did not market the protocol, and did not operate any service layer, the defence is strong. If the developer did any of those things – retained an admin key, collected protocol fees, ran a user-facing frontend, or promoted the protocol's privacy features to attract users – the "just code" defence weakens materially. The line is conduct-based, not categorical, and it is the developer's burden to structure contributions to stay on the safe side of that line.

Related at OBOLUS

FAQ

Can stolen crypto actually be recovered?

Yes, where the response is immediate and the forensic trail leads to an identifiable custodian or exchange. Recovery depends on securing a freezing order or account preservation order before the assets are moved or mixed. Courts in England, the DIFC, Singapore and Hong Kong routinely grant such relief on an urgent, often ex parte, basis where the applicant demonstrates a good arguable case and a risk of dissipation. The critical variable is speed: recovery windows are measured in hours after a theft is detected, not days or weeks.

How fast must I act after a digital-asset theft?

Within hours, where possible. Once misappropriated digital assets are moved from the initial destination address, traced through a chain of wallets or mixed through a privacy protocol, the recovery difficulty compounds exponentially. The first step is to engage forensic analysts to trace the funds and identify any custodial chokepoint – an exchange, a custodian or a payment processor – where the assets are held. If such a point is identified, an application for urgent freezing relief should be prepared and filed the same day or, where the facts permit, on an emergency out-of-hours basis. Any delay reduces the likelihood that the funds will still be at the identified address when the order is served.

Can a court freeze assets held on an exchange?

Yes. Courts in the leading common-law recovery forums have clear jurisdiction to grant proprietary injunctions, freezing orders and account-preservation orders over digital assets held by an exchange or custodian, even where the defendant is pseudonymous or located offshore. The court's power derives from its jurisdiction over the exchange as a third party holding the assets. The procedure is typically a Norwich Pharmacal or Bankers Trust disclosure application to compel the exchange to identify the account holder, followed by a freezing application once the defendant is known. Where the risk of dissipation is urgent, the court may grant interim relief freezing the assets before full disclosure is obtained.

About OBOLUS

OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across more than seventy jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across more than twenty-five forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the whole of our practice. Operators we advise routinely face the question of how to structure protocol contributions to limit liability exposure while preserving the decentralised design that defines the technology. To discuss your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.

By Glen Sorensen, Disputes & Recovery Analyst – Specialising in cross-border asset tracing, freezing relief and exchange-disclosure applications in the England, DIFC and Singapore forums.

This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.

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