For a crypto group sitting between two or more booking centres, the question of where profit is earned is rarely answered by where the licence sits. Transfer pricing for AIFC-based (Astana International Financial Centre) digital-asset groups turns on how intercompany arrangements map to actual functions, assets and risks – and Kazakhstan's domestic regime, layered over the AIFC's common-law framework, requires that map to be deliberate from the first day of operations. A group that prices its intercompany flows correctly from inception avoids a corrective reckoning that is expensive and disruptive. This page sets out the analytical structure, the cross-border pressure points, and the practical steps we take with clients building or rationalising a crypto holding structure in the AIFC.
Transfer pricing risk for crypto groups in Kazakhstan arises at the intersection of the country's domestic tax code, the AFSA (Astana Financial Services Authority) licensing framework, and the OECD arm's-length principle that Kazakhstan has incorporated into national law. The AIFC common-law perimeter does not insulate an entity from Kazakhstani corporate tax obligations where economic substance is insufficient. Founders who treat the AIFC purely as a licensing shell – without genuine headcount, decision-making, or contractual authority in Almaty – expose the group to recharacterisation of intra-group margins and, in a worst case, to permanent establishment findings in the jurisdiction where the real work happens.
What transfer pricing means for a digital-asset group operating through the AIFC
Transfer pricing is the set of rules that determines the price at which related entities within the same corporate group exchange goods, services, intellectual property or financing. For digital-asset businesses, the most commercially significant intercompany flows are typically: technology licensing fees paid to an IP-holding entity; trading or market-making commissions charged by an exchange subsidiary to a group proprietary-trading desk; custody or safeguarding fees; and intra-group loans used to fund licence applications or market expansion. Each of those flows must be priced as if the parties were unrelated and dealing at arm's length.
Kazakhstan has adopted the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as the interpretive baseline for arm's-length analysis. The AFSA, operating within the AIFC, supervises licensed entities on conduct and prudential matters; the substantive corporate tax position is determined by the Kazakhstani revenue authority for entities that fall within the national tax perimeter. An AIFC-licensed entity that earns income in Kazakhstan and holds genuine economic substance there is generally treated as a resident taxpayer. That is the structural goal: enough substance in the AIFC to justify the pricing, enough documentation to withstand a query, and a holding architecture that does not inadvertently create taxable presence elsewhere.
The process above describes the standard analytical path. Your facts – the entity count, the licence categories, the location of your technical and management teams, and your banking arrangements – change the analysis significantly. To map your group's transfer pricing exposure before you commit to the structure, contact OBOLUS at Map your options.
How the AIFC common-law framework intersects with Kazakhstani tax law
The AIFC operates under English common-law principles applied by the AIFC Court; disputes within the perimeter can be resolved there without recourse to the national court system. That structural separation is a genuine commercial advantage. It does not, however, create a separate tax universe. Kazakhstani corporate income tax applies to AIFC entities that derive income from Kazakhstani sources or that are managed and controlled from Kazakhstan – the standard rules of corporate tax residency.
For a crypto group, "managed and controlled" is the trigger to watch. If the group's board meetings are held in Kazakhstan, if the chief executive or chief investment officer works from Almaty, or if the server infrastructure processing trades is located there, the revenue authority has grounds to assert that the strategic decisions of the group are made in Kazakhstan. That converts what was intended as a pass-through or IP-holding entity into a Kazakhstani tax resident – potentially recharacterising all group income as locally taxable regardless of where the legal entity was incorporated.
We regularly advise clients on the boundary between genuine AIFC substance and nominal presence. The AIFC's common-law environment, its AFSA licensing framework, and the availability of the AIFC Court as a dispute forum are real structural advantages. Making them tax-effective requires that the substance behind the entity is documented contemporaneously – not reconstructed at audit.
Which intercompany flows carry the highest transfer pricing risk for crypto groups?
Not all intercompany flows are equally contested. In our cross-border practice, four categories attract the most scrutiny in digital-asset group structures.
IP licensing is the highest-risk category. A crypto exchange or token-issuance platform built on proprietary software is typically the group's most valuable asset. If that IP was developed outside Kazakhstan and then licensed to the AIFC entity, the royalty must reflect an arm's-length rate benchmarked against comparable licences – and the licensing entity must hold the genuine functions associated with ownership: development risk, enhancement decisions, economic title. Groups that simply register IP in a low-tax holding company and route royalties through it without corresponding substance will face a direct challenge from any revenue authority applying OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting principles.
Intra-group service fees – for compliance, technology support, marketing, and treasury management – are the second major category. The arm's-length price for a service is usually determined by reference to the cost-plus method, but only where the service provider genuinely performs the service and bears the associated costs. A group that centralises all real staff and infrastructure in one jurisdiction while invoicing a fee to the AIFC entity has, in substance, moved the profit without moving the function.
Financing arrangements – intra-group loans and capital injections – carry risk where interest rates are out of range with what a third-party lender would charge to an entity of the borrower's credit profile. For crypto businesses, that profile is often unrated, which makes benchmarking harder; documentation is therefore more, not less, important.
Finally, trading commissions and profit-sharing between an exchange entity and a group proprietary desk require careful design. Where the exchange is licensed under the AFSA framework and the desk is booked offshore, the commission rate and the allocation of market risk must reflect the economic reality of who is bearing what exposure.
What does arm's-length documentation look like in practice for an AIFC crypto entity?
Kazakhstan follows a three-tier documentation structure consistent with the OECD framework: a master file setting out the group's global business and transfer pricing policy; a local file specific to the Kazakhstani entity's controlled transactions; and, for larger groups, a country-by-country report. The thresholds triggering each obligation vary by the size of the group and the nature of the transactions – consult current legislation for the applicable thresholds at the time of filing.
For a crypto group, the local file is where the analytical work sits. It must document the following for each material intercompany flow: the commercial rationale for the arrangement; the functions performed, assets deployed, and risks borne by each party (the FAR analysis); the method selected to price the transaction; the benchmarking data supporting the price; and the actual outcome compared to the benchmark range.
In our practice, we see two recurring mistakes at the documentation stage. The first is using a generic transfer pricing policy drafted for a traditional financial-services group without adapting it to crypto-specific functions – the functions of a staking validator, a custody platform, or a DeFi protocol manager are not directly comparable to a conventional fund manager. The second is treating the documentation as a one-time exercise. Transfer pricing documentation must be contemporaneous; it should be updated each time a material intercompany agreement changes, a new service is added, or the group's functional profile shifts.
How does personal tax residency interact with the group structure?
A common misconception among founders relocating to the AIFC or to Kazakhstan broadly is that the personal move is the decisive event. It is not. Personal tax residency and corporate structure are analytically distinct but commercially interdependent – and the decision on each must account for the other.
A founder who is a Kazakhstani tax resident but who continues to make strategic decisions for entities incorporated elsewhere creates potential permanent establishment exposure in Kazakhstan for those entities. Conversely, a founder who has moved personally but left the group's key functions – IP development, trading decisions, counterparty contracting – in their original jurisdiction has not meaningfully shifted the group's taxable presence. The personal move and the corporate restructure must be designed together.
Kazakhstan's individual income tax regime applies to residents on their worldwide income. The AIFC environment does not create a personal tax exemption for individuals; AFSA-licensed activity affects the entity, not the natural person behind it. Exit tax considerations also apply where a founder is relocating from a jurisdiction that levies a deemed-disposal charge on departure – the sequencing of the corporate restructure relative to the personal residency change can determine whether a charge arises at all.
We align founder residency planning with the holding structure and the exit plan from the outset. The structure that works for a five-year horizon to an institutional sale differs from the structure that optimises for ongoing dividend extraction or for a token distribution event.
If a prior restructuring effort stalled, or if a banking relationship closed following a change of structure, a second review can identify the structural cause and the path forward. Write to OBOLUS at Map your options.
The cross-border banking and substance interaction for AIFC crypto entities
Banking is the operational constraint that most frequently forces a structural rethink. AIFC-licensed entities have access to Kazakhstani banking relationships, and some international correspondent banks accept AIFC-regulated entities where they do not accept unlicensed crypto operators. But correspondent banking access for a crypto group is never unconditional – it depends on the entity's licence category under the AFSA framework, the jurisdiction of its beneficial owners, the nature of its business flows, and the quality of its AML and KYC infrastructure.
Transfer pricing and banking interact in two ways. First, the structure of intercompany payments – particularly high-volume royalty or service-fee flows between the AIFC entity and offshore affiliates – must be explainable to a correspondent bank's compliance team at the same level of clarity as to a revenue authority. A transfer pricing policy that is technically defensible but commercially opaque will trigger enhanced due diligence or account termination. Second, the AIFC entity's income profile must be consistent with its licence. An entity licensed for custody services that is booking large trading commissions from an offshore desk raises questions for the bank that it also raises for the regulator.
We work through the banking layer alongside the legal and tax structure – in our practice, the three are rarely separable for a crypto group. Operators we advise routinely encounter correspondent banking conditions that effectively dictate what intercompany flows are permissible; addressing those conditions before the banking relationship is established saves significant corrective work later.
Decision matrix: which operator profile benefits from an AIFC-centred holding structure?
Not every crypto group is well-served by a primary AIFC entity. The holding structure that fits a group depends on its functional profile, its investor base, and the jurisdictions where its users sit.
A group whose primary market is the CIS region – Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus – and that is building a regulated exchange or brokerage will find the AIFC genuinely suited as the primary licensed entity. The AFSA framework provides credibility with institutional counterparties, the AIFC Court provides enforceable dispute resolution, and the common-law environment supports sophisticated commercial documentation. The transfer pricing baseline is well-established, and the regime is internationally recognised by FATF-aligned supervisors. The key risk for this profile is substance: the group must genuinely run its operations from Almaty, not administer the licence remotely.
A group that is primarily EU-facing, or that anticipates a significant user base in regulated Western markets, will typically need a CASP (Crypto-Asset Service Provider) authorisation under the EU's MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation) regime in parallel with the AIFC entity. In that structure, the AIFC entity may function as a regional operating company or IP-holding entity, with the MiCA-authorised entity holding the primary European licence. The transfer pricing question then becomes how to allocate profit between the two – which turns on where the genuine value-creating functions (technology development, risk management, customer acquisition) are performed.
A token-issuing group that anticipates a public distribution event should consider whether the AIFC entity is the appropriate issuer, or whether a separate issuance vehicle in a jurisdiction with clearer token-classification guidance is preferable. That decision affects the transfer pricing structure because it determines where the IP associated with the token protocol is held and who bears the development risk. We typically model this as a three-entity structure: an AIFC operational entity, an IP-holding or issuance entity in a complementary jurisdiction, and a treasury or investment vehicle for reserve management – with clearly documented and arm's-length flows between each.
In a recent matter, a digital-asset group with CIS-focused exchange operations and a separately incorporated EU entity engaged us to rationalise the intercompany pricing across the two entities. The group had been operating under an informal cost-sharing arrangement that was not documented to the standard required by either jurisdiction's transfer pricing rules. We prepared a contemporaneous local file and master file, repriced the intercompany service agreement on a benchmarked cost-plus basis, and structured the IP ownership correctly in the AIFC entity. The outcome was a defensible position in both jurisdictions and, of practical significance, a banking relationship that the EU entity had been unable to establish because the prior intercompany structure had not survived compliance review.
Self-assessment checklist for AIFC crypto groups on transfer pricing readiness
Before engaging counsel, a group can self-assess its transfer pricing position against the following markers. This is not a substitute for professional advice; it is a diagnostic for identifying where the analysis is most urgent.
First: does the group have a written intercompany agreement for each material related-party flow? Undocumented arrangements are the most common and most easily correctable deficiency. Second: does the AIFC entity have its own staff, its own management decision-making, and its own contractual relationships with third parties – or does it rely entirely on services provided by affiliates? Third: has the group analysed whether any non-AIFC entity in the structure might be deemed a Kazakhstani permanent establishment, based on where decisions are made and where people work? Fourth: has the transfer pricing documentation been reviewed in the last 12 months, or since the last material change in the group's business or structure? Fifth: is the group's banking structure consistent with the intercompany flows documented in the transfer pricing file?
Groups that cannot answer yes to all five should treat that as a priority rather than a deferred item. Revenue authorities in the AIFC's peer jurisdictions are increasingly sharing information under multilateral exchange frameworks; a position that was low-risk in an information-siloed environment carries higher exposure today.
Related at OBOLUS
- Tax and cross-border structuring for digital-asset businesses – how we design tax-efficient multi-entity structures for crypto operators worldwide.
- Token tax treatment in Bermuda – the comparative position for groups considering an Atlantic holding structure alongside the AIFC.
- Economic substance for licensed VASPs: where the legal lines are drawn – a cross-jurisdictional analysis of what substance requirements actually demand from digital-asset licensees.
FAQ
Where should a token-issuing entity be domiciled?
Domicile for a token-issuing entity depends on three factors: the applicable token classification in the target markets, the regulatory regime governing the issuance, and the tax treatment of issuance proceeds and ongoing protocol revenues. The AIFC is a viable issuance hub for CIS-facing projects, but EU-facing issuers generally require a separate MiCA-authorised entity. In both cases, the choice of domicile should be made alongside the IP-holding and transfer pricing structure, not independently of it.
How are staking rewards taxed?
The tax treatment of staking rewards is jurisdiction-specific and, in many regimes, still developing. In Kazakhstan, the general principle is that income earned by a tax-resident entity is subject to corporate income tax on an accruals or receipts basis, depending on the applicable method. Whether staking rewards are characterised as ordinary income, capital receipts, or something else depends on the nature of the staking activity and the entity's accounting treatment. We advise clients to obtain a position before commencing staking activity rather than resolving the classification retrospectively.
Does remote working create tax residency risk?
Yes – and for crypto groups it is a material risk. If a senior employee or founder works remotely from a jurisdiction other than where the AIFC entity is incorporated, their activity can constitute a sufficient presence for a permanent establishment finding under that jurisdiction's domestic law or the applicable tax treaty. The risk is higher where the individual has authority to conclude contracts or make investment decisions on behalf of the entity. Remote working arrangements for key personnel should be assessed against the PE rules of both the home jurisdiction and the jurisdiction where the individual is physically located.
OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across 70+ jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across 25+ forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the entirety of our practice, and we act only for businesses – which means the counsel we provide is calibrated to an operator's commercial reality, not to a retail client's concerns. We align founder residency with the holding structure and exit plan, and we treat transfer pricing as a structuring tool, not a compliance afterthought. To discuss your group's position, contact info@oboluslaw.com.
By Lydia Brennan, Tax & Structuring Analyst – specialist in cross-border digital-asset tax structure, transfer pricing documentation, and founder residency planning for AIFC and EU-facing crypto groups.
This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.