A DeFi protocol launches an autonomous market-maker that adjusts pool weights algorithmically, borrows from an oracle-fed lending vault and executes trades on behalf of liquidity providers. Six months in, the agent misreads a price feed during a flash-crash, liquidates a position against the documented parameters and locks collateral the user expected returned. The user sues. The question the court asks first is not whether the code worked as written – it is who the defendant is, and on what legal basis that entity or person can be held to account for an action the software took independently.
Liability for autonomous on-chain agents sits at the intersection of agency law, contract formation and tort. Traditional principal-agent doctrine assumes a human principal directs a human or artificial agent within a supervisory relationship the law can map. Autonomous agents – smart contracts that custody assets, execute strategies and interact with external protocols without real-time human instruction – compress that supervisory link into immutable code deployed at genesis. The legal question is whether the deployer, the governance-token holder, the protocol treasury or no one at all bears responsibility when the agent's autonomous action causes loss. This analysis examines the liability frameworks courts and regulators apply to on-chain agents, the contractual techniques that allocate risk ex ante, and the structuring decisions that position a protocol between defensible decentralisation and enforceable accountability.
Agency doctrine meets code
Traditional agency law turns on control, benefit and manifestation of authority. A principal is liable for an agent's acts within the scope of actual or apparent authority; a third party who contracts with the agent on the principal's behalf acquires rights against the principal if the agent acted with authority. Autonomous on-chain agents complicate every element. The code itself has no legal personality. The deployer who published the contract may have renounced the admin key. The governance forum that voted to deploy the agent issues no employment contract. The user who deposits collateral into the vault interacts with a bytecode address, not a counterparty who signed terms.
In our cross-border practice structuring DeFi protocols, we see three judicial approaches emerging. The first treats deployment as a continuing act of control: the entity or individual who deployed the contract remains the principal, and immutability is an operational feature, not a severance of liability. Under this view, renouncing the admin key does not extinguish the deployer's responsibility for the agent's future acts – it simply locks in the instructions. The second approach looks to economic benefit: the entity or DAO treasury that collects protocol fees or governs parameter updates is the principal, regardless of whether it can pause the contract in real time. The third, advocated by protocol teams but not yet widely adopted by courts, treats a sufficiently decentralised and immutable system as having no principal at all – the code is the agreement, and the user's recourse is limited to what the contract's terms (readable in the bytecode or a verified source) provide.
None of these analyses is universal. A protocol incorporated in the British Virgin Islands with a disclosed SPV issuer and a published liability-limitation clause may defend under contract law; the same protocol, marketed to US retail users without a terms-of-service flow, faces negligence and consumer-protection claims that bypass contractual defences. Operators positioning for the third model – no liable principal – must demonstrate both technical immutability (no admin key, no upgrade path, no governance override of core logic) and substantive decentralisation (distributed token ownership, no controlling interest, open validator or keeper set). Falling short on either axis leaves the protocol in the first or second model, with liability attaching to the deployer or the treasury entity.
Who controls the agent
Control is the anchor. If a natural person or legal entity retains the technical or economic ability to alter, pause or redirect the agent's behaviour, most jurisdictions will treat that party as the principal for liability purposes. The analysis begins with the contract's permission structure. An agent with an owner role callable by a single externally-owned account or a multisig wallet under the project team's control places liability with that owner. Renouncing ownership does not erase liability for losses caused by actions the agent took while the key was live; it limits liability for future autonomous behaviour only if the renunciation is verified, irreversible and part of the protocol's disclosed design from the outset.
Governance adds a layer. If a token-holder DAO can vote to change parameters – collateral ratios, fee rates, oracle sources – the DAO itself becomes the principal in many regulatory and common-law analyses. A DAO is not automatically shielded by the absence of legal personality. In disputes we advise on, claimants name the DAO's treasury multisig signers, the foundation that facilitated the vote or the largest token holders as joint principals under a theory of economic control. Courts in England, Singapore and the Cayman Islands have demonstrated willingness to pierce informal governance structures when the substance shows centralised economic benefit, regardless of the label.
For protocols seeking to position governance outside traditional principal-agent liability, we layer three design elements. First, narrow governance scope: token votes affect fee distribution or treasury grants but do not touch the agent's core execution logic. Second, time-locks and delay mechanisms: a parameter change approved today takes effect only after a published delay, giving users an exit window and signalling that the relationship is consent-based, not a principal's unilateral instruction. Third, published disclosures that the agent operates autonomously and that governance votes allocate only economic rights – not supervisory authority – over the protocol's automated functions. These elements do not eliminate liability, but they shift the analysis from agency to contract: the user's recourse is framed by what the system's documented rules provide, not by a principal-agent imputation of responsibility.
Contractual versus tortious claims
When a user deposits into an autonomous vault and suffers loss, the choice of claim matters. A contractual claim asserts that the protocol breached the terms the user agreed to – the vault promised "collateral returned upon repayment" and failed to deliver. A tortious claim – typically negligence or negligent misstatement – asserts that the deployer or operator owed a duty of care, breached it by deploying defective or misleading code, and caused loss. The distinction determines which defences are available, which forum has jurisdiction and whether a liability waiver or limitation clause binds.
Protocols structured with a terms-of-service flow and a disclosed legal wrapper can channel claims into contract. The user's deposit triggers acceptance of terms that define the system's behaviour, allocate risk and specify remedies. The vault's documented parameters – "liquidation occurs when collateral value falls below 110 per cent of borrowed amount" – become contractual warranties. If the code executes those parameters correctly, there is no breach; if the code deviates, the breach is measurable against the stated terms. Tort claims are harder to sustain when the user consented to defined risks, the system operated within disclosed parameters and no representation outside the contract induced reliance.
In the absence of a terms flow, the claim defaults to tort. A user who discovers the vault interface through a third-party aggregator, deposits via a wallet interaction and never sees a legal notice has not agreed to anything. The deployer's potential liability rests on whether it owed a duty of care – whether, by offering the system to the public, it impliedly represented that the code was fit for purpose and free from material defects. Regulators and claimants argue that launching a custody-taking protocol implies such a duty; protocol teams counter that open-source code published permissionlessly carries no implied warranty. The safer position, in the jurisdictions where we see enforcement, is that a duty arises when the deployer markets the protocol, collects fees or maintains an economically dependent relationship with users – facts that move the analysis away from "published tool" toward "service provider."
Drafting for contract over tort means front-loading the terms. The first wallet interaction triggers a signature over a message that incorporates the protocol's legal terms by reference. The on-chain contract emits an event logging acceptance. The interface displays a summary of key risks – oracle failure, liquidation mechanics, no recourse for code bugs – before the deposit transaction is broadcast. These steps do not eliminate all liability, but they anchor the user's claim in what the system promised, not in an external standard of care a court might later impose.
Oracle failures and external dependencies
Autonomous agents rarely operate in isolation. A liquidation bot pulls price data from an oracle; a yield aggregator deposits into vaults it does not control; a cross-chain bridge relies on a relay that reads state from another network. When the agent acts on bad data – an oracle reports a stale price, a relay halts mid-transaction – the question is whether the principal (if one exists) is liable for the external dependency's failure. The answer turns on foreseeability, disclosure and whether the principal retained discretion over the dependency's selection.
If the protocol's documentation identifies the oracle by name and describes the liquidation logic as dependent on that feed, a user who suffers loss from a stale price may argue that the protocol warranted the oracle's reliability. The protocol's defence is twofold: first, that the dependency was disclosed and the user assumed the risk; second, that the protocol is not vicariously liable for the oracle's independent failure unless the protocol and the oracle are under common control or the protocol negligently selected an unreliable source. Courts treat these arguments with varying sympathy. In disputes over algorithmic stablecoin de-pegs and liquidation cascades, claimants have successfully argued that a protocol's choice to rely on a single oracle without fallback or sanity checks constitutes negligence, regardless of disclosure.
Structuring for defensibility means layering redundancy into the design and limiting reliance representations in the terms. The agent queries multiple oracles and applies a median or a stake-weighted average; it halts execution if feeds diverge beyond a threshold; it logs every data input on-chain so that disputes over "what the agent saw" are verifiable. The terms state that external data sources are outside the protocol's control, that the user bears the risk of inaccurate or delayed feeds, and that the protocol's obligation is limited to executing the logic correctly given the inputs it received – not to guaranteeing those inputs. This framing does not shield against all claims, but it narrows liability to what the protocol directly controlled: the agent's execution of its own rules.
A protocol we advised deployed an autonomous rebalancing vault that adjusts its portfolio daily based on volatility signals. The signals come from a decentralised oracle network the protocol does not operate. The terms specify: "The vault executes rebalancing decisions based on data from [Oracle Network]. [Protocol] does not control, verify or warrant the accuracy of that data. Your deposit acknowledges that incorrect data may result in suboptimal rebalancing and that your recourse is limited to exiting the vault." When a signal glitch caused an unintended rebalance, the terms confined the user's claim to whether the vault executed its own rebalancing formula correctly – which it had – rather than whether the oracle's data was sound.
Immutability as a double-edged sword
Immutability – the property that an on-chain agent, once deployed, cannot be altered – is both a liability shield and a liability magnet. Protocols market immutability as trustlessness: users need not rely on the team's ongoing honesty because the code cannot change. That same immutability, however, means the deployer cannot fix a bug, pause a cascade or reverse a transaction even when the equitable outcome is clear. If the agent's behaviour causes loss and the loss was foreseeable, the fact that the deployer cannot intervene becomes evidence, not of decentralisation, but of recklessness in deploying defective code without a safety mechanism.
In a recent matter a lending protocol deployed an immutable liquidation engine. A pricing oracle failed during a market dislocation; the engine liquidated positions at prices the users argued were "obviously wrong." The users sued the deployer for negligence. The deployer's defence was that the contract was immutable and therefore no principal-agent relationship existed post-deployment. The claimants countered that immutability was a design choice, that a responsible deployer would have included a circuit-breaker or a governance pause, and that deploying a high-stakes financial contract without any corrective mechanism was itself negligent. The matter settled, but the theory – that immutability without safeguards is a breach of duty – has gained traction in regulatory commentary.
The practical takeaway: immutability as a feature must be paired with pre-deployment assurance. Formal verification of the contract's core logic, third-party audits with disclosed scope, economic simulation of edge cases and published post-mortems of testnet failures all serve as evidence that the deployer exercised reasonable care before locking the code. A protocol that deploys immutable agents after rigorous testing and documents those efforts stands on firmer ground than one that immutably deploys untested code and claims decentralisation as a liability shield.
Limited liability wrappers
A purely on-chain agent has no legal personality. Liability, if any, attaches to the humans or entities behind it. The question is whether interposing a legal wrapper – a foundation, an SPV, a DAO LLC – limits that liability or simply gives claimants a clear target. The answer depends on the jurisdiction, the economic substance and whether the wrapper's corporate veil can withstand scrutiny.
Foundations in Switzerland, the Cayman Islands and Panama are common wrappers for DeFi protocols. The foundation holds the protocol's intellectual property, controls the treasury multisig and publishes the terms under which users interact with the protocol. When structured correctly, the foundation's liability is limited to its assets; the foundation's council members are not personally liable for the protocol's obligations. The structure works best when the foundation genuinely operates at arm's length from the original dev team: the team contributes code as a service provider, the foundation licenses it and governs the deployment, and day-to-day protocol operations are automated or delegated to keepers the foundation does not directly employ.
DAO LLCs under Wyoming or Marshall Islands law offer another model. The DAO wraps itself in a liability-limited entity; members are shielded from personal liability for the DAO's acts. The model is effective for governance DAOs that vote on treasury allocations or protocol parameters but less clear for autonomous agents that execute outside the DAO's direct control. If the agent is a sub-component the DAO deployed, courts may treat the agent's acts as the DAO LLC's acts; if the agent was deployed independently and the DAO merely governs an unrelated treasury, the DAO's liability for the agent's failures is attenuated.
In our practice we layer the wrapper with contract. The foundation or DAO LLC is the counterparty in the user-facing terms; it disclaims liability for bugs, oracle failures and market events beyond its control; it caps damages at the amount the user deposited or a multiple of fees paid. The wrapper then seeks indemnity from service providers – auditors, oracle operators, keepers – for failures within their respective scopes. The effect is to create a liability chain: the user's claim runs against the wrapper, the wrapper's claim runs against the sub-contractor and the sub-contractor's liability is capped by its engagement terms or insurance. None of these structures is bulletproof, but they convert an open-ended claim against an unidentified "protocol" into a defined claim against a known entity with articulated defences.
If a prior application stalled or an account was closed, a second read can surface the structural reason and the route back. For protocols navigating the liability allocation between deployer, wrapper and DAO governance, pressure-testing the structure before deployment surfaces the points of maximum exposure. Contact us at info@oboluslaw.com or through the contact page to map your risk allocation and drafting requirements.
Misrepresentation and marketing risk
Even a well-structured autonomous agent attracts liability if the protocol's marketing creates representations the code cannot honour. A dashboard that projects "8 per cent APY" when the yield depends on external market conditions may constitute negligent misstatement if a user relies on that figure and the yield falls short. An interface that shows "your collateral is safe" while the underlying contract allows liquidation under documented conditions is a false representation if the safety claim is unqualified. Liability for misrepresentation does not require an agency relationship; it requires reliance, a false statement and damage.
The risk is highest in jurisdictions with broad consumer-protection or financial-promotion regimes. The United Kingdom's FCA financial promotion rules apply to crypto marketing directed at UK users; MiCA in the European Union will impose similar obligations on marketing communications. A representation about the behaviour of an autonomous agent – "this vault automatically rebalances to maintain your target allocation" – is a factual claim that must be supportable. If the vault fails to rebalance during a gas-price spike or an oracle outage, the claim is false unless the disclosure clearly stated the conditions under which rebalancing might not occur.
Drafting defensively means aligning the interface language with the contract's terms. Yield projections are labelled "estimated, not guaranteed, based on historical data." Safety claims are replaced with "collateral subject to liquidation under the documented parameters." Performance marketing is hedged: "the agent executed its rebalancing logic in X per cent of intervals over the past 90 days; future performance is not guaranteed." Every representation that a user might rely on in deciding to deposit is cross-checked against the code's actual behaviour and qualified in the terms. The goal is not to eliminate all marketing, but to ensure that what the marketing says is either objectively true or clearly framed as forward-looking and conditional.
Cross-border enforcement realities
Autonomous agents operate globally; liability does not. A user in Germany deposits into a vault governed by a Cayman foundation, interacts through an interface hosted in Singapore and suffers loss when the agent executes a liquidation rule written by developers in Portugal. The conflict-of-laws analysis – which jurisdiction's law applies, which court has jurisdiction – turns on where the harm occurred, where the user is domiciled, where the defendant is incorporated and what the terms specified. Absent a clear forum-selection and choice-of-law clause, the claimant can often choose among several forums, and the protocol must defend in whichever is least favourable.
Protocols serving a global user base mitigate forum risk by including exclusive jurisdiction and governing-law clauses in the terms. The clause must be prominent, unambiguous and presented before the user's first transaction. A typical formulation: "These Terms are governed by the law of [Jurisdiction]. Any dispute arising out of or relating to these Terms or your use of the Protocol shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of [Jurisdiction], and you irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of those courts." Enforcement of such clauses is strong in common-law jurisdictions and in civil-law systems that recognise party autonomy, but less reliable in consumer-protection regimes that void forum-selection clauses in standard-form contracts.
In structuring for enforceability, we map the user base. If a protocol expects material EU traffic, a Cayman-only forum clause may not bind an EU consumer; the better approach is to offer EU users a separate terms variant with an EU jurisdiction or an arbitration pathway that satisfies MiCA and consumer-protection directives. If the protocol is B2B – serving funds, market-makers and institutional liquidity providers – the forum clause is far more likely to stick, and a single governing law across all users is defensible. The key is that the clause must match the user profile and the substance of the relationship; a boilerplate clause copied from another protocol is evidence of a drafting shortcut, not a considered allocation of forum risk.
What decentralisation actually means for liability
Protocols market "decentralisation" as though it were a liability off-ramp. The theory is that if no single party controls the system, no single party can be held responsible for its failures. The theory is correct in one narrow circumstance: when the system is genuinely immutable, the governance is dispersed beyond any controlling interest, and the economic benefit flows to a broad and shifting user base rather than a fixed entity. That circumstance is rare.
In most cases decentralisation is partial. The protocol's execution layer is immutable, but a foundation or core-dev team controls the interface, the documentation and the oracle integrations. Governance is conducted by token holders, but the largest holders are insiders or VCs with board representation at the wrapper entity. Fees are distributed to stakers, but a significant share flows to a treasury the original team governs. Each of these facts re-centres control in a way that reintroduces principal-agent or direct-liability risk. A claimant does not need to prove absolute control; the test in most jurisdictions is whether the defendant exercised sufficient control, received sufficient benefit or held itself out as sufficiently responsible that imposing liability is fair and reflects the economic reality.
We see two structuring responses. The first is to acknowledge the partial decentralisation and manage liability through contract and insurance rather than claiming immunity. The protocol's terms state clearly that the wrapper entity governs certain off-chain components, that the autonomous agent operates within documented parameters and that the user's recourse is defined by the terms – not by a general duty of care the entity never assumed. The second is to pursue genuine technical and economic decentralisation as a long-term goal, recognising that only a system with no upgrade keys, no controlling token concentration and no entity collecting the majority of revenue can credibly claim that no defendant exists. The middle path – claiming decentralisation while retaining control – is the highest-risk posture.
Should you build accountability into the agent
The hardest design question is whether the agent should have an override. A pause button controlled by a multisig allows the protocol to halt the agent if a cascade is detected; a governance-activated upgrade path allows the community to patch a discovered bug. Both mechanisms reduce the risk of runaway losses, but they also reintroduce the principal-agent analysis: if you can pause it, you control it, and if you control it, you are liable when you choose not to pause and loss occurs. The alternative – a fully immutable agent with no override – eliminates that discretionary-control risk but leaves no corrective mechanism if the unforeseen happens.
The answer depends on the agent's function and risk profile. For a low-stakes utility contract – a token swap router, a simple AMM pool – immutability with no override is defensible. The logic is simple, the edge cases are well-understood, and the maximum loss per user is bounded. For a high-stakes autonomous system – a collateralised lending protocol, a cross-chain custody bridge, an algorithmic stablecoin with reserve management – building in a circuit-breaker or a time-locked upgrade mechanism is the more prudent choice. The mechanism must be narrow, transparent and constrained by public parameter bounds; it should trigger only on objective conditions (oracle deviation beyond X per cent, gas price above Y, total-value-locked drop of Z per cent) rather than subjective "emergency" discretion. This design threads the needle: it preserves automated operation under normal conditions while giving the protocol a defined safety valve that is itself rule-bound and disclosed.
When we draft the legal layer for such a mechanism, the terms describe the override as a protective feature, not a supervisory relationship. The protocol "may pause the Agent under the documented circuit-breaker conditions; such a pause does not constitute a warranty that the protocol will detect all adverse conditions or that pausing will prevent all loss." The disclosure shifts user expectation: the pause mechanism is a best-effort safeguard, not a guarantee, and its existence does not convert the protocol into a fiduciary or a warrantor of outcomes. That framing reduces, though does not eliminate, the risk that the ability to pause will be recharacterised as a duty to pause in every situation where, in hindsight, a pause might have helped.
Insurance and risk mutualisation
Traditional liability insurance for autonomous on-chain agents is sparse. Underwriters struggle to quantify the risk when the insured has limited control over the triggering event and the policy would cover losses arising from code the insurer cannot audit in real time. Parametric and on-chain insurance protocols offer an alternative: a user deposits a premium, and the policy pays out automatically if an on-chain condition is met – a liquidation occurred, an oracle feed deviated, a vault's total value locked fell below a threshold. These products shift the coverage from "the protocol's liability" to "the user's loss from a defined event," bypassing the need to establish fault.
Protocols can integrate such coverage as an opt-in feature. The interface offers the user a choice: deposit at standard rates, or deposit and purchase parametric coverage at a higher all-in rate. The coverage is provided by a third-party on-chain insurer; the protocol facilitates the purchase but is not itself the insurer and therefore not liable under the policy. If a covered event occurs, the user's claim is against the insurance pool, not the protocol. This structure reduces the protocol's direct liability while giving users a mechanism to hedge specific risks they consider material. It works best for discrete, verifiable events – oracle failures, liquidations triggered during flash-crashes – and less well for subjective claims like "the yield was lower than projected."
How courts will likely evolve the doctrine
The law's answer to autonomous agents is still forming. Early cases have treated them as contract-execution tools, imposing liability on the deployer or the wrapper entity when loss occurs and a traditional defendant can be identified. As protocols mature and decentralisation becomes less rhetorical, courts will face harder questions: can there be a breach of duty when no human made a real-time decision? Is code itself capable of negligence, or does negligence require a mind? If an autonomous agent operates exactly as documented and a user still suffers loss, does any claim lie, or is the loss simply the user's assumption of a disclosed risk?
The likely evolution is toward a tiered model. Protocols with disclosed legal wrappers, published terms and meaningful decentralisation will be held to a contract standard: the agent's behaviour is measured against what the terms promised, and liability attaches only for deviation or material non-disclosure. Protocols that remain structurally centralised – single admin key, undisclosed team control, marketing that overstates autonomy – will face the full suite of principal-agent, negligence and consumer-protection liability. The emerging middle tier – protocols that started centralised and are progressively decentralising – will be judged on trajectory and transparency: did the protocol clearly disclose the current state of control, and did it follow a credible path toward reducing that control over time?
For operators, the message is that labels do not control outcomes. Calling a system "autonomous" or "decentralised" does not make it immune if the substance shows ongoing control. The defence is built in the code's design, the transparency of its governance, the precision of its terms and the evidence that the team exercised reasonable care in deploying something immutable. That evidence starts at the design stage, not after a dispute arises.
The process above describes the standard path. Your facts – the entity, the user base, the banking – change the analysis. For a scoped assessment of where liability sits in your protocol's architecture and how the terms should allocate that risk, contact OBOLUS at info@oboluslaw.com.
Related practices
- DeFi, Tokenization & Smart-Contract Law – regulatory classification, protocol structuring and the legal layer for decentralised finance and tokenized instruments.
- Tokenized Treasury Products: Issuance and Fund Structuring – structuring, prospectus and offering-document work for on-chain treasury and yield-bearing instruments.
- DeFi Protocol Legal Structuring in Singapore – the MAS regime, licensing pathways and liability wrappers for protocols with a Singapore nexus.
FAQ
Can a decentralised protocol be regulated?
Yes, if any entity or group exercises control over its deployment, marketing or economic benefit. Regulators look through the "decentralised" label to the substance: who holds upgrade keys, who collects fees, who can halt the system. A protocol with no controlling party, no mutable parameters and no concentrated token ownership may sit outside traditional regulatory perimeters, but that state is rare. Most protocols retain enough centralised touchpoints – a foundation, a core team, a treasury – that some regulatory framework applies, and the regime's scope depends on the jurisdiction and the activities the protocol enables.
Who is liable when a smart contract fails?
Liability typically attaches to the deployer, the entity that marketed the contract or the party that collected fees from its operation – whichever exercised control or received benefit. If the contract is genuinely autonomous and immutable, and the user accepted documented terms, the claim may be confined to whether the contract executed its own rules correctly. If the contract was mutable, under the control of a known entity or marketed with representations that proved false, that entity is the defendant, and the analysis turns on agency law, negligence or contract breach depending on the claim's structure.
What wrapper suits this structure?
The choice depends on where users sit, what the protocol does and whether you need regulatory cover or only liability limitation. A Cayman or BVI foundation works for globally accessible, non-custodial protocols where the user base is sophisticated and cross-border enforcement is a concern. A Wyoming or Marshall Islands DAO LLC suits governance-heavy protocols where token holders vote on treasury or parameter decisions. A Swiss foundation offers a middle path with strong IP protection and alignment with MiCA for EU-facing offerings. The wrapper must match the substance: if the entity actually governs the protocol, its liability is real; if the entity is a passive registration vehicle, the structure may not withstand scrutiny.
About OBOLUS
OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across 70+ jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across 25+ forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the entirety of our practice. Protocol structuring, liability allocation and smart-contract terms are recurring mandates: we assess classification against the substance of rights, not the marketing label, and we draft for enforceability in the jurisdictions that matter to your user base and your risk appetite. To discuss your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.
By Roman Levitt, Technology & DeFi Counsel – specialising in smart-contract enforceability, protocol liability structures and the legal engineering of decentralised systems.
This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.