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Directors' Duties in Digital-Asset Companies

Directors' Duties in Digital-Asset Companies. Independent digital-asset law for exchanges, issuers and funds. Cross-border scope, fixed-fee engagements. Talk to

A token issuer preparing for a VASP licence in Malta discovers that two of its three directors lack professional-indemnity cover and that custody keys sit on a personal device belonging to the chief technology officer. The application stalls. The regulator asks who oversees reserve management and whether the board has written procedures for incident response. The business answers that it operates "founder-led." The Malta Financial Services Authority notes that answer in the file and requests a boardroom overhaul before the next review. The legal question is not whether the company needs a licence – it plainly does – but whether the people running it understand what a regulated digital-asset business demands of its board.

Directors of crypto exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds occupy a sharpened fiduciary and statutory position. They carry the same baseline duties as directors of any company – loyalty, care, and oversight – but the regulatory perimeter around digital assets turns those duties into live personal exposure. A director of a VASP in a MiCA jurisdiction or under the Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority in Dubai holds personal accountability for AML systems, customer-asset segregation, operational resilience and continuous disclosure to the regulator. Where the business is unlicensed, statutory and common-law duties still apply, and breach can trigger disqualification, personal liability and, in some cases, criminal exposure. This analysis maps what the board owes, where exposure sits and how to structure oversight so that a licensing bid or an audit does not surface a governance vacuum.

What directors owe under company and financial law

Directors' duties arise from two sources: the company statute under which the entity is incorporated and, where the business is regulated, the licensing and conduct rules of the relevant regulator. Both layers bind simultaneously. A director of a Cayman exempted company holding a Virtual Asset Service Providers Act registration owes the baseline duties set out in Cayman company law and the heightened standards the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority expects of VASP directors. The regulatory layer does not replace the statutory layer; it sits on top of it, often with stricter timelines, more granular reporting and personal sign-off obligations that the Companies Act does not prescribe.

The statutory baseline in common-law jurisdictions – England and Wales, BVI, Cayman, Gibraltar, Singapore, Hong Kong – is drawn from codified or judge-made principles of fiduciary duty and the duty of care. Directors must act within their powers, promote the success of the company, exercise independent judgment, avoid conflicts of interest and exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. That care-and-skill standard is objective: the law measures it against what a reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the director's functions would have exercised. For a director of a digital-asset business holding customer funds or private keys, that standard already means understanding custody architecture, wallet-segregation models and AML-screening obligations before signing a quarterly certificate or an auditor representation letter.

In civil-law jurisdictions the director's position flows from the applicable commercial code or companies statute. Under MiCA, national competent authorities interpret the management-body requirements in the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation and issue supervisory expectations in guidance. The European Securities and Markets Authority has signalled that CASP directors are expected to demonstrate technical and operational competence, to ensure sound governance and to maintain clear accountability for key functions. Where a business is domiciled in a civil-law member state but targets customers across the European Economic Area, the board must satisfy both the local companies law and ESMA's MiCA-conduct expectations. A board that treats the licence as a compliance-team responsibility rather than a boardroom accountability is structurally unprepared for supervision.

The regulatory overlay for licensed and registering businesses

Where the business holds, is applying for or requires a VASP licence or equivalent authorisation, the regulatory framework imposes duties that go beyond the baseline company-law obligations. The regulator expects the board to own risk oversight, customer-asset protection, operational resilience and continuous compliance. That ownership is not delegated to the compliance officer; the board remains accountable.

Under VARA in Dubai, a licensed Virtual Asset Service Provider must maintain a board that includes at least two individuals with relevant experience, and the board is responsible for approving the risk-appetite statement, the business-continuity plan and the annual compliance report before submission. The regulator expects quarterly board minutes that demonstrate active review of key risk indicators, customer-complaint trends and material incidents. A business that submits pro-forma minutes or skips a quarter creates an inference of inadequate oversight, and the inference can trigger an on-site inspection or a suspension of new client onboarding while the regulator investigates.

In Abu Dhabi, the Financial Services Regulatory Authority within the Astana International Financial Centre expects directors of recognised virtual-asset businesses to be approved individually. The approval process includes a personal questionnaire, employment history, criminal-record checks in the applicant's home jurisdiction and, for senior management, a technical interview. Once approved, the director holds a continuing obligation to disclose material changes in circumstances – a second directorship at another regulated business, a personal insolvency, a regulatory investigation in another forum. Failure to disclose is itself a breach and can lead to withdrawal of approval and disqualification from holding regulated roles across the common-law world.

MiCA introduces a management-body accountability framework that aligns with the European Banking Authority's standards for credit institutions. The board of a Crypto-Asset Service Provider authorised under MiCA must approve the internal governance arrangements, establish an effective risk-management function, ensure segregation of customer crypto-assets and approve the annual report on safeguarding. That report must be submitted to the national competent authority within a defined period after year-end, and the submission must be signed by at least two directors. A late submission or a submission signed by only one director triggers a breach notice and, if repeated, can lead to a restriction on the licence – typically a prohibition on onboarding new customers until the governance deficiency is remedied.

For businesses not yet licensed but operating in a jurisdiction where authorisation is required, the statutory director's duties remain in force, and the unlicensed operation itself is a criminal offence in many regimes. Directors cannot plead ignorance of the licensing requirement; constructive knowledge is sufficient. A director who knows the business is an exchange or a custodian and who participates in board decisions without ensuring that the necessary authorisation has been obtained is exposed to personal liability under the applicable VASP statute, to disqualification under the insolvency or companies legislation and, in some cases, to money-laundering charges if the business has processed customer funds without registration. We have seen VASP businesses close after receiving a regulatory cease-and-desist, and the directors discover only then that the closure does not extinguish personal exposure for the period the business operated without authorisation.

Oversight of customer assets, reserves and custody

The director's most acute personal exposure arises in the custody and segregation of customer crypto-assets and, for stablecoin issuers, in reserve management. Regulators across the major hubs treat customer-asset protection as the central supervisory priority, and boards are expected to demonstrate continuous oversight, not quarterly sign-off.

In a recent licensing matter for a custodian domiciled in a European Economic Area jurisdiction, the applicant's board submitted governance documentation that described the chief information officer as the sole keyholder for the cold-storage wallets. The regulator asked for evidence of multi-signature control, a disaster-recovery plan that did not depend on one individual and board minutes showing that the custody model had been reviewed and approved at board level. The business could not produce those minutes. The application was placed on hold, and the firm was required to redesign its custody architecture and to demonstrate that at least two non-executive directors understood the wallet structure well enough to challenge the technology team's decisions. The delay cost the business six months and a major listing opportunity that moved to a competitor with an approved licence.

For stablecoin issuers under MiCA, the board is accountable for ensuring that reserves backing asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens meet the composition, liquidity and segregation requirements set out in the regulation. The reserve must be held with a credit institution or a central bank, and a quarterly attestation by an external auditor must confirm that the reserve matches the outstanding token supply. The board must approve the appointment of the reserve custodian, review the custodian agreement for change-of-control or insolvency protections and ensure that the annual reserve report is filed within the regulatory deadline. A director who signs the annual report without verifying that the custodian arrangement is in place and that the reserve reconciliation has been performed is exposed to personal liability if the reserve is later found to be commingled or deficient.

In common-law jurisdictions, the director's duty of care extends to ensuring that the business has adequate systems to prevent misappropriation, fraud or operational loss of customer assets. That duty is judged against the standard of a reasonable director in the same circumstances. For a custodian or exchange, "reasonable" includes implementing multi-signature controls, maintaining hot-wallet insurance, segregating customer keys from operational keys and establishing incident-response procedures that can freeze suspicious transactions within minutes. A business that loses customer funds to a phishing attack or an inside compromise and later discovers that the board never reviewed the custody model, never asked for a penetration-test report and never confirmed that the insurance policy covered the loss is structurally unprepared to defend the directors from a negligence claim. The claims come from two directions: customers suing for breach of bailment or breach of contract, and the regulator pursuing the directors personally for breach of their oversight duties.

AML systems, the Travel Rule and board accountability

Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing obligations sit squarely on the board. The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, which underpin VASP AML standards worldwide, require the business to implement risk-based customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, suspicious-activity reporting and compliance with the Travel Rule – the obligation to pass originator and beneficiary information with virtual-asset transfers. The regulator holds the board accountable for ensuring that these systems exist, that they are tested and that they are resourced adequately.

Under VARA, a licensed VASP must appoint a money-laundering reporting officer and a compliance officer, and the board must approve both appointments. The board is expected to review quarterly compliance reports that include AML statistics: the number of customers onboarded, the number flagged during screening, the number of suspicious-activity reports filed and the average time to complete enhanced due diligence. If those statistics show that no suspicious-activity reports have been filed in a quarter despite high transaction volumes, the board is on notice that the monitoring system may be ineffective. A failure to investigate that red flag is itself a governance breach, and VARA has the power to impose administrative fines on individual directors as well as on the entity.

The Travel Rule creates a specific boardroom risk. As regimes converge on a de-minimis threshold below which originator and beneficiary data need not be passed, exchanges and custodians must implement systems that collect the required data at the point of transfer, validate it against the counterparty VASP's records and retain it for the applicable period. The systems are not trivial; they require integration with transaction-monitoring platforms, wallet-tagging databases and, in some cases, third-party Travel-Rule messaging services. A board that approves a product launch – say, an instant-settlement fiat-to-crypto on-ramp – without confirming that the Travel-Rule workflow has been built and tested is approving a product that will breach AML rules the moment the first transfer above the de-minimis threshold is processed. The breach creates personal exposure for the directors who voted for the launch.

In our cross-border practice, we have advised on post-incident remediation for a BVI-registered VASP that processed transfers to a sanctioned address. The business had no automated sanctions-screening on outbound transactions; the compliance officer was checking a publicly available list manually once per week. The board had not asked how sanctions screening was implemented, had not reviewed the compliance budget and had not confirmed that the compliance officer had access to a real-time sanctions feed. When the breach was discovered during a regulatory examination, the BVI Financial Services Commission required the board to commission an independent review, to remediate the compliance gaps at the board's expense and to provide quarterly assurance to the regulator for two years. The cost of remediation exceeded the firm's annual compliance budget by a factor of four. The directors were not fined personally, but the incident appeared in the public register and made subsequent capital-raising significantly harder.

Incident response, disclosure and the regulator's expectation

Digital-asset businesses are high-velocity environments: a hack, a liquidity shortfall or a market-manipulation allegation can surface in the middle of a weekend, and the board must be prepared to act within hours. Regulators expect incident-response plans that designate decision-makers, set escalation thresholds and prescribe timelines for disclosure. The board is responsible for ensuring that the plan exists, that it has been tested and that all directors know how to reach each other outside business hours.

MiCA requires a CASP to notify its national competent authority of any major operational or security incident "without undue delay" and, in any event, within a period specified in the regulatory technical standards. "Major" is defined broadly: an incident that materially affects the entity's ability to provide services, that compromises customer data or that leads to loss or theft of customer crypto-assets. The notification must include a preliminary assessment of the cause, the affected systems, the number of customers impacted and the steps taken to contain the incident. A board that learns of a potential breach on a Friday afternoon and decides to wait until Monday to investigate has already missed the "without undue delay" standard if the breach turns out to be material.

VARA prescribes a notification timeline of 24 hours for a major incident and requires a follow-up report within 72 hours. The 24-hour clock starts when the business becomes aware of the incident or, if earlier, when it ought reasonably to have become aware. That "ought to have known" standard catches businesses that disable alerting systems, that do not review monitoring dashboards regularly or that rely on a single compliance officer who is unreachable at weekends. A board that has not confirmed how the business monitors for incidents and who receives the alerts is unprepared for the post-incident regulatory inquiry, and the regulator will presume inadequate governance unless the business can demonstrate that the board reviewed and approved the monitoring model.

In a recovery mandate we handled for a payments processor that experienced an on-chain exploit, the attacker drained a hot wallet of stablecoins during a Saturday night. The business discovered the loss on Sunday morning. The board met by emergency video call, decided to notify law enforcement and to freeze the affected wallets but did not notify the regulator until Tuesday – 72 hours after discovery. The regulator in the relevant jurisdiction treated the delay as a separate breach, imposed a fine and required the business to revise its incident-response policy and to conduct a board training session on disclosure obligations. The board had assumed that notifying law enforcement was sufficient and that the regulator would be informed through the police. That assumption was incorrect; the duty to notify the regulator is independent and non-delegable.

Personal exposure during the licensing or registration process

The act of applying for a VASP licence or registering under AML rules creates its own layer of director exposure. Application forms and supporting documents are signed declarations. A director who signs a "fit and proper" attestation, a financial-projections document or a description of the custody model is personally certifying the accuracy of those statements. If the regulator later discovers that the projections were inflated, that the custody model was not implemented as described or that a director failed to disclose a prior regulatory sanction, the signing director is exposed to a finding of misleading the regulator – a breach that can lead to a personal prohibition order, a fine and referral for criminal investigation.

Under the Payment Services Act in Singapore, applicants for a Digital Payment Token service licence must submit detailed business plans, financial forecasts, technology architecture descriptions and personal declarations from all directors and senior management. The Monetary Authority of Singapore cross-checks those declarations against its own records, against international regulatory databases and, in some cases, against corporate registries in the applicants' home jurisdictions. A director who omits a prior directorship at a failed fintech startup or who fails to disclose that they are subject to ongoing litigation in another forum will be flagged during the vetting process. MAS treats the omission as a fitness issue and typically refuses the application or requires the director to resign before the licence can be granted.

For businesses acquiring a licensed VASP through a change-of-control transaction, the acquirer's directors become subject to the same vetting as if they were applying for a new licence. The regulator will require personal questionnaires, source-of-wealth declarations and, in some cases, interviews. A director who assumes that the seller's licence will transfer automatically without regulatory approval is mistaken; most VASP regimes require advance approval of any change in control, and operating under the licence before approval is granted is itself a breach. The acquiring directors are personally liable for that breach even if they relied on the seller's assurance that "the licence is portable."

Cross-border director duties in group and multi-licence structures

Digital-asset businesses typically operate through group structures: a holding company in one jurisdiction, an operating VASP in a second, a treasury or token-issuer subsidiary in a third and, often, a separate entity for each major market. Directors sitting on multiple boards within the group face layered and sometimes conflicting duties. A director of both the parent and the licensed subsidiary owes separate duties to each entity. Where the group's interests and the licensed subsidiary's interests diverge – for example, where the parent needs the subsidiary to upstream cash but the subsidiary needs that cash to meet its regulatory capital requirement – the director must prioritise the interests of the entity on whose board they are acting in that moment.

Under MiCA, a CASP that is part of a wider group must ensure that intra-group arrangements do not compromise its ability to meet its regulatory obligations. The regulator expects the CASP's board to review and approve all material intra-group agreements, to confirm that the CASP retains sufficient resources to operate independently if the parent group encounters financial distress and to disclose any arrangement under which the CASP's assets or client funds could be claimed by a group creditor. A director who approves an intra-group loan that leaves the CASP undercapitalised is breaching their duty to the CASP, and the regulator can hold that director personally accountable even if the parent board ratified the loan.

In a licensing matter we handled in Malta, the applicant VASP was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Cayman holding company. The holding company had issued convertible notes to early investors, and the note agreement included a cross-guarantee from all group subsidiaries. The MFSA noted during the application review that the cross-guarantee could make the VASP's assets available to the noteholders if the parent defaulted, and the regulator required the guarantee to be released before the licence could be issued. The VASP's board had not identified the conflict during the application drafting phase; the holding-company directors had signed the note agreement without considering the impact on the VASP's regulatory capital. Releasing the guarantee required a waiver from the noteholders, which took three months to negotiate and delayed the licence by a full quarter. The lesson: directors of regulated subsidiaries must review group financing arrangements with regulatory-capital implications before they are signed, not after.

What boards owe when the business should be licensed but is not

A board that continues to operate a digital-asset business without the required authorisation exposes each director to statutory and common-law liability. In jurisdictions where VASP licensing is mandatory for certain activities – exchange, custody, issuance of payment tokens, transfer services – carrying on those activities without a licence is a criminal offence. The offence typically attaches to the entity and to "any director, manager, secretary or similar officer" who consented to or connived in the offence. Passive participation is not a defence; a director who attends board meetings, reviews management accounts showing customer deposits and signs annual accounts that disclose the business model is presumed to have known that the business was operating as a VASP and is liable if the business was not authorised.

In the United Kingdom, providing certain cryptoasset services without registration under the Money Laundering Regulations is a criminal offence punishable by up to two years' imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both. The Financial Conduct Authority maintains a public register of registered cryptoasset businesses, and operating without registration has led to prosecutions and to director disqualifications. A director who resigns before enforcement action does not escape liability for the period during which they held office; the statute of limitations runs from the date of the offence, not the date of resignation.

Directors of unlicensed VASPs also face civil liability. Customers who lose funds held by an unlicensed exchange or custodian may sue the directors personally for breach of fiduciary duty, knowing assistance in breach of trust or conspiracy to defraud, depending on the forum and the facts. Where the business becomes insolvent while unlicensed, the liquidator may pursue the directors for wrongful trading or for breach of duty in allowing the business to continue trading while insolvent. The absence of a licence does not remove the statutory director's duties; if anything, it sharpens them, because the directors knew or ought to have known that they were operating outside the law.

Structuring boardroom oversight for a digital-asset business

Effective governance for a licensed or licensing VASP, token issuer or custodian starts with a written allocation of responsibilities. The board should approve and minute a governance framework that designates which decisions require board approval, which can be delegated to management and which require regulatory pre-approval. The framework should be specific: does the board approve every new product, or only products that introduce a new asset class or a new custody model? Does the board approve the appointment of every third-party service provider, or only those holding customer assets or performing AML screening?

The board should establish at least two standing committees: a risk and compliance committee and an audit committee. The risk and compliance committee reviews AML reports, incident logs, regulatory correspondence and breach registers and escalates issues to the full board. The audit committee oversees the external audit, reviews the financial statements, confirms that customer assets are segregated and reconciled and engages the auditor on any qualified opinion or material uncertainty. Both committees should meet quarterly at a minimum and should keep minutes that demonstrate substantive discussion, not pro-forma approval.

Each director should receive a formal induction on the regulatory framework applicable to the business, the custody architecture, the AML systems and the incident-response plan. That induction should be documented, and directors should sign an acknowledgment that they have read and understood the framework. Annual refresher training should cover regulatory updates, new products and lessons from incidents at peer businesses. A regulator reviewing the governance file during an on-site inspection will ask for evidence of training; a business that cannot produce it will be asked why the board believed it was competent to oversee a regulated activity without formal preparation.

The board should establish key risk indicators that are reported at every board meeting: the number of customers onboarded, the volume of assets under custody, the number of AML alerts triggered, the percentage of alerts that resulted in a suspicious-activity report, the average time to resolve a customer complaint, the number of operational incidents and the status of regulatory filings. Those indicators should be tracked over time, and the board should investigate any trend that suggests weakening controls. A spike in unresolved AML alerts or a drop in the filing-timeliness rate is a red flag that the compliance function is under-resourced or that process discipline is deteriorating.

Transitioning from founder-led to regulator-ready governance

Many digital-asset businesses begin as founder-led operations: decisions are made quickly, informally and with minimal documentation. That model works when the business is small, unlicensed and pre-revenue. It fails the moment the business applies for a VASP licence or crosses a registration threshold, because the regulator expects formal governance – board minutes, written policies, signed approvals and an audit trail showing that key decisions were reviewed and ratified at board level.

The transition from informal to formal governance is often the hardest part of a licensing process. Founders accustomed to making decisions by Telegram chat or email thread must accept that material decisions now require a board resolution. Equity holders accustomed to direct influence over the business must route their input through the board rather than instructing management directly. And the board must accept that it cannot delegate regulatory accountability; even where day-to-day compliance is handled by a compliance officer or an external consultant, the board remains personally accountable for ensuring that the systems work.

In a VARA application we worked on for an exchange transitioning from unlicensed to licensed operation, the founding team initially resisted formal board meetings, arguing that "we all sit in the same office and talk every day." VARA's application guidance requires board minutes covering key governance decisions for the 12 months before application, and the business had none. We had to reconstruct the decision history from email threads and Slack logs, draft retrospective resolutions covering those decisions and have the board sign and date them with an acknowledgment that they were formalising informal decisions. The regulator accepted the reconstruction but noted it as a governance weakness and required the business to hold monthly board meetings with formal minutes for the first year of operation post-licence. The lesson: start formal governance at least 12 months before you plan to apply, not during the application drafting.

When directors should engage independent legal advice

Directors are entitled – and in some circumstances obliged – to take independent legal advice at the company's expense. That right is especially important in digital-asset businesses, where regulatory and technical complexity mean that a director cannot reasonably be expected to assess risk without expert input. A director who is unsure whether a proposed stablecoin structure complies with the asset-referenced token regime under MiCA should insist that the board commission independent counsel to advise before the product launches. A director who suspects that the business is operating without the required authorisation should take personal legal advice on their exposure and their duty to raise the issue at board level.

Directors should engage counsel in the following situations: where the business is considering applying for a licence and the board needs to understand what governance changes are required before submission; where the regulator has opened an investigation or has issued a breach notice; where the business is considering acquiring or merging with another licensed entity and change-of-control approvals are required; where a major incident has occurred and disclosure obligations may be triggered; where a director is considering resignation and wants to understand their continuing exposure for acts or omissions during their tenure; and where a shareholder or creditor is threatening litigation and the board needs advice on whether the company's insurance covers director and officer liability.

Counsel engaged to advise the board should be independent of management and should report directly to the board or to a board committee. Where the issue concerns a potential conflict between the interests of the company and the interests of a major shareholder or of the management team, the board should engage separate counsel for itself. Legal advice commissioned by management and presented to the board as "our lawyers say" is not independent advice; the board is entitled to test that advice with its own counsel, and a regulator conducting a post-incident review will ask whether the board received independent input or whether it relied solely on management's interpretation.

Addressing the assumption that governance is a compliance-team responsibility

A common assumption among digital-asset founders and boards is that regulatory compliance is the compliance officer's job and that the board's role is to review and approve what the compliance team produces. That assumption is incorrect and dangerous. Compliance is an executive function; governance is a board function. The compliance officer designs and implements the AML system, conducts risk assessments, prepares regulatory filings and liaises with the regulator on day-to-day matters. The board owns the risk appetite, appoints and oversees the compliance officer, reviews the effectiveness of compliance systems and is accountable to the regulator for ensuring that the business operates within the regulatory perimeter.

The distinction becomes critical when something goes wrong. If an exchange processes a transfer to a sanctioned address, the regulator will ask two questions: why did the compliance system fail to flag the transaction, and why did the board not identify that the compliance system was inadequate? The first question is for the compliance officer and the technology team; the second is for the board. A board that has never reviewed the sanctions-screening logic, never asked how often the sanctions database is updated and never tested the system with a sample transaction cannot credibly argue that it exercised adequate oversight. The regulator will find a governance failure even if the compliance officer acted diligently within the system the board approved.

Boards should challenge management on compliance matters. If management reports that AML monitoring generated 200 alerts in the quarter and that all were cleared as false positives, the board should ask: what threshold triggers an alert, has that threshold been tested, why is the false-positive rate 100 percent and does that rate suggest the system is miscalibrated? If the annual audit letter includes a qualified opinion on the segregation of customer assets, the board should not accept management's assurance that the issue will be resolved by next year; it should commission an independent review immediately, suspend new customer onboarding if necessary and report the issue to the regulator if the business is licensed. Passive acceptance of management reports is not oversight; it is abdication, and the regulator will treat it as such.

Self-assessment for directors: are you prepared for licensing or supervision?

Directors of digital-asset businesses can assess their own preparedness with the following checklist. If the answer to any question is no, the board has a governance gap that should be closed before the business applies for a licence or before the next regulatory inspection:

  • Does the board meet at least quarterly, and are minutes taken and signed at each meeting?
  • Has the board approved a written governance framework that allocates decision-making authority between the board, management and, where required, the regulator?
  • Does the board review key risk indicators at every meeting, and are those indicators trended over time?
  • Has every director received formal training on the regulatory framework, the custody model, the AML obligations and the incident-response plan?
  • Does the board have direct access to the compliance officer and the money-laundering reporting officer, and do those officers report to the board (or a board committee) as well as to management?
  • Has the board reviewed and approved the business-continuity plan, and has that plan been tested in the last 12 months?
  • Does the board know how customer crypto-assets are held, whether they are segregated, whether multi-signature controls apply and who holds the keys?
  • Has the board confirmed that the business has insurance covering operational loss, cybercrime and director and officer liability, and does the board review the policy annually?
  • Does the board receive quarterly reports from the compliance function that include AML statistics, incident logs and regulatory correspondence, and does the board minute its review of those reports?
  • Has the board confirmed that all regulatory filings for the current year have been submitted on time and that no material disclosures are outstanding?
  • If the business is part of a group, has the board reviewed all intra-group agreements to confirm that they do not compromise the entity's ability to meet its regulatory obligations?
  • Does each director know how to reach the other directors and the senior management team outside business hours, and has the board confirmed that the incident-response plan includes an out-of-hours escalation protocol?

A business that answers no to more than two of these questions is not ready for licensing and is exposed to regulatory censure if it is already licensed. Closing the gaps typically requires between three and six months of governance redesign, documentation and training. Starting that work during the licensing application is too late; it should begin at least 12 months before the planned application date or immediately if the business is already operating under a registration or provisional approval.

Related at OBOLUS

FAQ

How long does a crypto licence take to obtain?

Application timelines vary by jurisdiction and by the completeness of the submission. In fast-track jurisdictions such as Lithuania or the BVI, a complete application with all supporting documentation can be processed in a matter of weeks. In hubs with more intensive vetting – Dubai under VARA, Singapore under MAS, Malta under MiCA – the process typically takes several months from submission to approval, longer if the regulator requests additional documentation or if directors require re-vetting. The timeline also depends on whether the business is applying for a full licence, a provisional approval or a registration. Starting governance preparation and document assembly at least 12 months before the target go-live date is standard practice.

Which jurisdiction suits my crypto business?

The answer depends on where your customers are, where your banking relationships sit, the nature of your business model and the founders' personal tax residence. A business serving European customers will typically need MiCA authorisation in a member state; a business serving institutional clients in the Gulf may prioritise VARA or ADGM; a business with primarily Asian retail flow may look at Singapore or Hong Kong. The licensing decision and the corporate-structuring decision are made together, not sequentially. A scoped assessment maps the licence, the banking stack and the tax position as a single question, not three disconnected workstreams. To map the options for your situation, contact OBOLUS at info@oboluslaw.com.

Do I need a separate custody licence?

Whether custody requires a separate authorisation depends on the jurisdiction and on how custody is structured. Under MiCA, custody and administration of crypto-assets on behalf of clients is a defined service requiring CASP authorisation; it is not automatically covered by an exchange or brokerage licence. VARA in Dubai treats custody as a distinct regulated activity, and a business providing custody services must hold the relevant VARA approval even if it also operates an exchange. In some common-law jurisdictions, custody may be regulated as a financial service or as a trust activity, depending on the legal relationship between the custodian and the customer. A business that holds customer private keys, even if it does not charge a separate custody fee, is likely providing a custodial service and should confirm the licensing position before launch. If you are unsure whether your business model requires custody authorisation, write to info@oboluslaw.com for a structure review.

About OBOLUS

OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across 70+ jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across 25+ forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the whole of our practice. Operators we advise routinely tell us that working with a firm that understands both the technology and the cross-border regulatory perimeter removes the translation cost of working with generalist counsel. We structure licensing, banking and tax as one mandate rather than three disconnected workstreams, and we align founder residency with the holding structure and the exit plan so that the group's tax and governance positions are coherent from the start. To discuss your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com or visit our contact page.

By Aisha Tan, Licensing & Jurisdictions Analyst – specialist in VASP authorisation, cross-border regulatory strategy and corporate governance for digital-asset businesses across the major licensing hubs.

This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.

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