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Central Bank Digital Currency and Private Stablecoins: The Legal Interface

Central Bank Digital Currency and Private Stablecoins: The Legal Interface. Independent digital-asset law for exchanges, issuers and funds. Cross-border scope,

A payments company preparing to route transactions in both a central bank digital currency and a commercial stablecoin discovers that the two instruments sit under separate regulatory perimeters, raise distinct reserve and settlement questions, and pull the business toward incompatible custody models. The legal question is not whether to support one or the other – the market will demand both – but how to structure the platform, the licences and the money flows so that the firm can handle CBDC and private stablecoins without the obligations of one regime bleeding into the other.

Central bank digital currencies represent sovereign fiat issued and settled on ledger; private stablecoins are liabilities of the issuer, backed by reserves the issuer holds. Where a single intermediary touches both, the applicable framework, the licensing requirement, the reserve treatment and the cross-border constraint differ by instrument. In our cross-border practice, operators building payments infrastructure routinely face a choice: design the platform to isolate the two flows – operationally and legally – or accept that commingling them pulls the entire stack under the heavier regime. This analysis maps the interface, the decision points for intermediaries and the structural moves that preserve flexibility as CBDC pilots mature and stablecoin frameworks converge on the MiCA model.

What distinguishes a CBDC from a private stablecoin as a legal instrument

A central bank digital currency is a direct or indirect liability of the central bank, denominated in the sovereign unit of account and settled on infrastructure the central bank operates or supervises. A private stablecoin – under MiCA, an asset-referenced token or e-money token; under other regimes, variously a payment token, an e-money instrument or a regulated virtual asset – is a liability of the issuer, redeemable against fiat or a basket of assets the issuer holds in segregated reserve. The distinction turns on who bears the credit risk: the sovereign in the first case, the issuer in the second.

From the intermediary's perspective, handling CBDC typically requires authorisation from the central bank or participation in a closed settlement network; handling a private stablecoin requires either a payment-services licence or a VASP registration, depending on the jurisdiction and the stablecoin's legal classification. A firm that processes both instruments therefore sits at the intersection of central-bank policy, payment-services regulation and, where the stablecoin crosses borders or involves cryptographic transfer, virtual-asset supervision. The risk is that a single misstep in licence scope or reserve treatment triggers parallel enforcement in multiple regimes.

CBDC design varies by pilot. Some central banks envisage retail CBDC wallets held directly with the central bank; others adopt a two-tier model in which commercial banks and payment institutions intermediate, holding CBDC on their balance sheets and issuing claims to end users. Private stablecoins operate across both models: the issuer mints tokens against reserve, and intermediaries – exchanges, custodians, payment processors – facilitate transfer and redemption without taking the token onto their own balance sheet. The legal divergence appears when regulation treats CBDC-backed claims as deposits and stablecoin-backed claims as something else – electronic money, a security, or a general creditor position.

For a platform routing both CBDC and stablecoin payments, the licensing question is whether a single authorisation suffices or whether the business requires two parallel permissions. In most jurisdictions piloting CBDC, participation in the CBDC settlement layer is governed by the central bank under separate rules from the payment-services framework that regulates stablecoin issuance and transfer. A business approved to handle MiCA e-money tokens is not automatically authorised to settle retail CBDC, and vice versa. The structural answer for most operators is to establish the CBDC flow and the stablecoin flow as legally distinct services, ring-fenced at the operational level, so that a licensing gap in one does not contaminate the other.

Where reserve and settlement obligations diverge for the two instruments

Under MiCA, an e-money token issuer holds client funds in a segregated account at a credit institution and redeems at par on demand; an asset-referenced token issuer maintains a reserve that matches the composition and valuation methodology disclosed in the whitepaper. CBDC, by contrast, requires no issuer reserve because the central bank itself is the issuer; the intermediary's obligation is settlement accuracy – matching the ledger balance to the customer's claim – not reserve backing. A firm that intermediates both therefore manages two reserve models: full segregation and redemption rights on the stablecoin side, and ledger reconciliation without client-money protection on the CBDC side.

The practical divergence appears in how regulators audit the two flows. A payment-institution supervisor examining an e-money token expects daily reserve reconciliation, independent custody attestation and client-money safeguarding that survives the intermediary's insolvency. A central-bank auditor examining CBDC settlement expects real-time ledger accuracy, Know-Your-Customer compliance at the wallet level and adherence to the central bank's operational rulebook. The skill sets, the reporting cadence and the consequences of a discrepancy differ materially. Where both flows run through a single legal entity, the regulator with the heavier touch – typically the payment-institution supervisor – will extend its expectations across the entire platform, even to the CBDC flow that falls outside its formal perimeter.

Operators we advise routinely split the two services into separate legal entities to preserve the lighter CBDC settlement obligations and avoid pulling the entire business under payment-institution capital and safeguarding rules. The trade-off is operational: two licences, two compliance functions, two sets of external audits. The benefit is containment – a shortfall in stablecoin reserves does not freeze the CBDC settlement flow, and a central-bank sanction on the CBDC entity does not trigger a payment-institution licence review. In jurisdictions where the CBDC pilot permits only banks and licensed payment institutions to participate, the entity split becomes mandatory in practice, because the stablecoin flow requires a separate VASP registration that the CBDC authorisation does not cover.

How cross-border use of CBDC and stablecoins imposes distinct constraints

Private stablecoins move across borders by design; a MiCA-authorised e-money token issued in Lithuania is transferable EU-wide, and many issuers permit non-EU users subject to AML screening. CBDC, by contrast, is jurisdictionally bounded: most pilots restrict use to residents or entities domiciled in the issuing jurisdiction, and cross-border CBDC transfers depend on bilateral central-bank arrangements that remain experimental. A platform serving both instruments must therefore overlay two compliance models – one that assumes free transferability within the regulatory perimeter and beyond, and one that treats every cross-border movement as a permission question.

In practice, this divergence surfaces when a user attempts to fund a wallet with CBDC from jurisdiction A and then convert that balance into a stablecoin issued under jurisdiction B's framework. The legal question is whether the conversion constitutes a cross-border CBDC transfer – requiring central-bank approval under the CBDC rulebook – or a domestic redemption followed by a separate stablecoin purchase. Regulators in the major CBDC pilots have not yet issued guidance on this boundary, which means the intermediary bears the classification risk. Where classification is uncertain, the safe structure is to prohibit direct conversion and require the user to redeem the CBDC to fiat, move fiat through the traditional correspondent-banking layer, and then acquire the stablecoin in a separate transaction.

The cross-border constraint also affects where the platform can legally establish its treasury and settlement functions. MiCA permits a payment institution authorised in one member state to passport across the EU and to serve non-EU users under its home-state licence; a CBDC intermediary, by contrast, operates under central-bank rules that typically do not recognise passporting and require a local presence in the issuing jurisdiction. For a firm that wants to intermediate both, the licensing stack grows: an EU payment-institution licence for the stablecoin flow, plus a local entity in every CBDC-issuing jurisdiction where the business wants to participate. The cost and the governance burden of that structure often push operators to limit CBDC support to a single jurisdiction and to route all stablecoin activity through the passporting entity.

Which businesses need a CBDC settlement authorisation versus a stablecoin payment licence

CBDC settlement authorisation is typically required for any entity that holds a ledger balance on behalf of end users, issues wallet credentials, or initiates settlement instructions to the central bank's infrastructure. Most CBDC pilots limit participation to banks, licensed payment institutions and, in some cases, broker-dealers or central securities depositories. A merchant acquiring CBDC payments does not need a settlement authorisation if it relies on an authorised intermediary to convert CBDC to fiat at the point of sale; the authorisation requirement attaches to the entity that touches the CBDC ledger.

A stablecoin payment licence – in MiCA terms, either an e-money institution authorisation or a payment-institution licence that includes the "issuance of electronic money" or "execution of payment transactions" activities – is required for issuers, and for intermediaries that provide custody, facilitate transfers, or offer on-ramp and off-ramp services. An exchange listing stablecoins needs the licence if it takes custody of the stablecoins or intermediates fiat-to-stablecoin conversion; an exchange operating a pure secondary market in stablecoins without touching fiat may fall outside the payment-services perimeter and into VASP or investment-services regulation instead.

Where a business model touches both instruments, the determinative question is whether the platform segregates the two flows at the legal-entity level or combines them in a single authorisation. A payment institution authorised under MiCA to issue e-money tokens can, in principle, also apply to the central bank for CBDC settlement access, but the capital and safeguarding obligations of the payment-institution licence will apply to the entire entity, including the CBDC flow. The central bank may impose additional operational standards for CBDC settlement – real-time reporting,ледger access for supervision, mandatory participation in the central bank's dispute-resolution mechanism – that do not map cleanly onto payment-institution compliance. The structural move is to establish the CBDC activity in a separate entity that carries only the central-bank authorisation, leaving the payment-institution licence and the stablecoin flow in the original entity.

For businesses weighing the licence path, the decision tree runs as follows: if the target market demands only private stablecoins, pursue the payment-institution or EMI licence and skip CBDC; if the market demands CBDC settlement, apply for central-bank access and handle stablecoins through a separate entity or a third-party partner; if the market demands both and the business wants to offer seamless conversion, prepare for two licences, two compliance stacks and a treasury function that reconciles both fiat and on-ledger settlement.

The process and the timeline for each authorisation differ materially. Payment-institution licensing under MiCA follows a structured application and typically concludes within a defined period once the dossier is complete, subject to the competent authority's workload; CBDC settlement access depends on central-bank discretion, pilot capacity and the applicant's operational readiness to meet ledger-integration standards that remain in flux. A business that applies for both in parallel should assume the CBDC authorisation is the long pole and plan the go-live date accordingly.

Recent matter: a payment institution navigating dual authorisation

In a recent licensing matter, a payment institution sought to expand from MiCA-authorised stablecoin issuance into CBDC settlement as a pilot participant. The entity held an e-money token authorisation in an EU member state, had built fiat on-ramp and off-ramp infrastructure with partner banks, and now wanted to intermediate retail CBDC wallets on behalf of users in the same jurisdiction. The central bank's pilot rules required participants to demonstrate real-time ledger reconciliation, to implement wallet-level AML screening beyond the payment-institution baseline, and to accept central-bank override authority in the event of a systemic stress scenario – none of which appeared in the payment-institution rulebook.

The legal question was whether the existing payment-institution authorisation covered CBDC settlement or whether a separate application to the central bank was required. We reviewed the pilot framework and the payment-institution licence scope, confirmed that CBDC settlement fell outside the licensed payment services, and advised that a parallel central-bank application was mandatory. The entity restructured, establishing a subsidiary that applied for CBDC settlement access while the parent retained the stablecoin flow. The subsidiary's application is under review; the parent continues to issue e-money tokens without waiting for the central bank's decision. The structural split preserved the live stablecoin business and contained the risk that a central-bank licensing delay or rejection would freeze the payment-institution operations.

How custody and interoperability expectations differ between CBDC and stablecoins

CBDC custody, where the intermediary model permits it, is ledger-native: the balance resides in a wallet that the central bank's infrastructure recognises, and the intermediary's role is key management and user authentication, not balance segregation. Private stablecoin custody, by contrast, follows the payment-services or VASP model: the intermediary holds the tokens in a wallet it controls, maintains a ledger of customer entitlements, and safeguards the private keys against loss or theft under the applicable custody standards. The difference is that CBDC custody is typically non-transferable – the wallet is tied to a Know-Your-Customer identity that the central bank verifies – while stablecoin custody permits re-hypothecation and omnibus arrangements unless the regime explicitly prohibits them.

Interoperability between CBDC and stablecoins depends on whether the central bank permits atomic swaps or programmable settlement that includes private tokens. Most CBDC pilots restrict ledger functionality to fiat settlement and prohibit smart contracts that bridge to external assets. A stablecoin-to-CBDC swap therefore requires an off-ledger intermediary: the user redeems the stablecoin to fiat, the intermediary credits fiat to the user's account, and the user separately acquires CBDC through the central bank's issuance mechanism. The legal risk is that regulators treat the bundled service as a single payment chain and impose consolidated AML and safeguarding obligations across both legs. Operators building interoperability layers between CBDC and stablecoins typically insert a fiat break – a moment when the funds sit in a traditional bank account – to reset the compliance perimeter and avoid the argument that the service is an unregulated currency-exchange mechanism.

Where CBDC and stablecoins compete or complement existing payment rails

Central banks position CBDC as a public-infrastructure upgrade: faster domestic settlement, reduced reliance on correspondent banking, programmable payments and financial inclusion for the unbanked. Private stablecoins offer similar speed and programmability but operate on permissionless or semi-permissioned ledgers, introduce credit and liquidity risk at the issuer level, and – where the stablecoin is denominated in a foreign currency – bypass the domestic monetary authority entirely. The competitive dynamic turns on trust, cost and cross-border reach. CBDC carries sovereign backing and zero credit risk but is jurisdictionally constrained; stablecoins carry issuer risk but move globally without correspondent intermediaries.

For payments businesses, the strategic question is whether to treat CBDC and stablecoins as substitutes or as complementary rails. A domestic payroll service might adopt CBDC as the default settlement instrument and reserve stablecoins for international contractor payments that CBDC cannot reach. A cross-border remittance platform might use stablecoins as the primary rail and integrate CBDC only in jurisdictions where users demand fiat in/fiat out with local settlement finality. The legal constraint is that each choice pulls the platform into a different regulatory perimeter: CBDC into central-bank supervision and domestic payment law; stablecoins into MiCA or the local VASP regime and cross-border AML rules.

Operators we advise routinely run scenario models that compare capital, compliance cost and user-experience friction across three rails: CBDC settlement, stablecoin transfer and traditional correspondent banking. The outcome depends on transaction size, speed requirement, destination jurisdiction and whether the user prefers balance transparency on ledger or the anonymity of a traditional wire. In practice, most platforms that support both CBDC and stablecoins find that the two instruments serve non-overlapping use cases: CBDC for domestic, high-frequency, low-value payments where finality and sovereign backing matter; stablecoins for cross-border, medium-value transfers where speed and cost dominate the decision.

Regulatory convergence: when stablecoin rules start to look like CBDC settlement obligations

MiCA imposes reserve, redemption and transparency obligations on stablecoin issuers that begin to approximate the operational standards central banks apply to CBDC intermediaries. Both regimes require real-time settlement, ledger-level auditability, robust AML controls and the ability to freeze or reverse a transaction in response to a court order or a sanctions hit. The convergence raises the question: if a private stablecoin issuer is subject to CBDC-equivalent regulation, does it gain the operational protections and the central-bank liquidity access that CBDC intermediaries enjoy?

The answer in every major jurisdiction is no. Regulatory equivalence for compliance purposes does not confer central-bank privileges. A MiCA-authorised e-money token issuer meets stringent standards, but it remains a private entity without access to central-bank settlement, emergency liquidity facilities or the sovereign-guarantee mechanisms that protect CBDC. The implication for platforms is that where stablecoin regulation tightens to CBDC-equivalent standards, the cost and the operational burden of supporting private stablecoins rise without a corresponding gain in credit-risk mitigation or liquidity backstop. At that inflection point, some issuers may exit the market, consolidating stablecoin issuance among a small number of systemically important institutions that can bear the capital and compliance load.

For intermediaries, the strategic risk is that regulatory convergence leaves stablecoins over-regulated relative to their utility and under-supported relative to CBDC, pushing users toward central-bank instruments and eroding the business case for private stablecoin infrastructure. The counter-argument – and the reason many operators continue to build for both – is that stablecoins retain the cross-border and programmability advantages that CBDC pilots have not yet delivered at scale. The legal posture is to monitor MiCA implementation and central-bank pilot expansions in parallel, and to maintain optionality by licensing for both until the market signals which instrument gains dominance.

Recent matter: structuring a platform for dual-rail payments

In a recent structuring engagement, a payments company sought to launch a merchant-acquiring service that accepted both CBDC and euro-denominated stablecoins, converting each at the point of sale to fiat in the merchant's account. The business model required real-time foreign-exchange pricing, ledger integration for CBDC settlement, stablecoin custody and safeguarding for the period between customer payment and merchant payout, and AML screening at both the customer and merchant levels. The jurisdiction was an EU member state piloting retail CBDC under central-bank supervision, and the company held a payment-institution licence that covered euro payment processing but not CBDC settlement.

We mapped the licensing and reserve obligations for each leg: CBDC settlement required a separate central-bank authorisation and real-time ledger reconciliation with no safeguarding obligation, because the CBDC balance never left the central bank's infrastructure; stablecoin custody required safeguarding under the payment-institution rules and daily reserve attestation. The legal structure split the two flows: a subsidiary applied for CBDC settlement access and held only the merchant-payout logic, while the parent entity handled stablecoin custody and conversion under its existing payment-institution licence. The fiat leg – merchant payout – was consolidated in a single treasury function that received funds from both subsidiaries, reconciled daily and reported to the payment-institution supervisor.

The outcome: the CBDC flow launched within the pilot's capacity window; the stablecoin flow scaled independently without waiting for central-bank clearance. The entity split added a second compliance overhead but preserved business continuity when the central bank imposed a temporary pause on new CBDC-participant onboarding midway through the pilot.

Tax and banking considerations for firms handling both instruments

Tax treatment of CBDC is generally equivalent to fiat: a transfer of CBDC is a transfer of legal tender, and any gain or loss on currency fluctuation is recognised under ordinary foreign-exchange rules. Stablecoin transfers, by contrast, may trigger a disposal event for tax purposes in jurisdictions that treat stablecoins as property rather than currency, even where the stablecoin is pegged to fiat and redeemable at par. The divergence creates a compliance asymmetry: a platform that processes CBDC payments reports them as fiat transactions with no capital-gains implication, while the same platform processing stablecoin payments may need to track acquisition cost, calculate gain on each transfer and withhold tax where the user is a taxable person.

Banking access for CBDC settlement depends on whether the central bank permits participants to hold fiat reserves in traditional banks or requires participants to hold all reserves on the CBDC ledger. Most pilots adopt a hybrid model: CBDC settlement happens on ledger, but participants maintain fiat accounts for operational liquidity and for customer on-ramp and off-ramp. Stablecoin issuers, by contrast, are required under MiCA to hold reserves in credit institutions within the EU, which means banking access is a licensing pre-condition – if the issuer loses its bank account, it cannot meet the reserve obligation and must suspend issuance. Operators supporting both CBDC and stablecoins therefore face different banking risks: CBDC settlement is insulated from traditional de-banking because the central bank provides the ledger access, while stablecoin operations remain vulnerable to account closures that can halt the entire business overnight.

For cross-border platforms, the tax and banking intersection becomes acute when the entity sits in one jurisdiction, the CBDC is issued by a second jurisdiction's central bank, and the stablecoin is authorised under a third jurisdiction's payment-services regime. Each leg pulls in a different tax authority, a different banking supervisor and a different AML framework. The structural answer for most operators is to consolidate as much of the fiat treasury as possible in a single banking jurisdiction with stable account access, and to route CBDC settlement through local entities that carry only the minimum reserves required by the central bank's pilot rules.

Operator profile and the appropriate licensing path

A domestic-only payments business targeting retail users in a CBDC pilot jurisdiction should pursue CBDC settlement authorisation as the primary licence, with stablecoin support deferred until the pilot scales. The operational simplicity and the central-bank backing outweigh the limited cross-border utility. A cross-border remittance platform serving multiple corridors should prioritise a MiCA payment-institution licence and integrate stablecoins as the primary rail, adding CBDC only in corridors where the destination jurisdiction operates a live retail pilot with merchant acceptance. A custody provider holding both CBDC and stablecoins on behalf of institutional clients requires two separate custodial authorisations – one from the central bank for CBDC wallets, one under the VASP or payment-institution regime for stablecoin custody – and should establish each in a separately capitalised entity to contain operational and regulatory risk.

An exchange listing both CBDC-settled pairs and stablecoin pairs faces the question of whether to intermediate both legs or to rely on third-party liquidity providers for one instrument. Where the exchange holds a VASP or investment-services licence but not a payment-institution licence, the safe path is to list stablecoin pairs and to route CBDC settlement through a licensed payment-institution partner, avoiding the cost and the governance burden of a dual authorisation. The trade-off is margin: the exchange earns spread on the stablecoin pairs and pays the partner a per-transaction fee on the CBDC leg.

For platforms that have already secured a payment-institution licence and want to add CBDC, the licensing decision turns on whether the central bank's pilot is open to payment institutions or restricted to banks. Where payment institutions are eligible, the business can apply for CBDC access under the existing entity, but must segregate the CBDC flow operationally and accept that the payment-institution supervisor will audit the CBDC compliance function as part of the broader licence review. Where the pilot is bank-only, the payment institution must acquire a banking licence, partner with a bank or defer CBDC until the pilot expands – a decision that depends on how critical CBDC access is to the business model and whether the market is willing to wait.

For a scoped assessment of your dual-rail payments structure, including the licence stack, reserve treatment and cross-border tax posture, contact OBOLUS at info@oboluslaw.com. The process above describes the standard licensing paths. Your facts – the entity domicile, the target corridors, the banking relationships – change the analysis, and a structure review surfaces the optimal entity split and the sequence for authorisation applications.

A common assumption about interoperability

A common assumption among payments businesses planning to support both CBDC and private stablecoins is that interoperability will arrive through technical standards – a common messaging protocol, an atomic-swap layer, or an ISO 20022 extension that treats both instruments as fungible payment types. The assumption is that once the standards are in place, a single platform can route CBDC and stablecoin payments through a unified API, with the legal and regulatory perimeter adjusting automatically to the instrument in transit.

In practice, interoperability at the technical layer does not eliminate the legal divergence. A common messaging standard may simplify integration, but it does not convert a private stablecoin into a central-bank liability, does not merge the payment-institution reserve rules with the CBDC settlement rules, and does not grant a stablecoin-licensed entity automatic access to the central bank's ledger. The licensing, the capital, the safeguarding and the supervisor remain distinct. Platforms that build for technical interoperability without addressing the legal split discover the gap when a regulator questions why CBDC settlement is happening under a payment-institution licence that does not list CBDC as an authorised activity, or why stablecoin reserves are absent when the entity claims to intermediate both instruments under a single treasury function.

The practical implication is that interoperability must be structured at the legal-entity level, not just the API level. A platform that wants seamless user experience across CBDC and stablecoins needs two licences, two compliance stacks, and an internal transfer mechanism – typically a fiat break – that resets the regulatory perimeter between the two legs. Technical interoperability enables the user experience; legal entity segregation ensures that each instrument flows through the correct authorisation without contaminating the other. The platforms that succeed in offering both do so by treating the dual-rail structure as a feature of the business model, not as a temporary complexity that standards will eventually erase.

FAQ

Can a crypto firm access banking under this regime?

Banking access for digital-asset firms depends on the entity's authorisation status, the jurisdiction and the bank's risk appetite. A payment institution licensed under MiCA typically qualifies for accounts at EU credit institutions under the payment-services framework, but CBDC settlement may require a separate account relationship with the central bank or a bank designated by the pilot. Stablecoin issuers and VASP must demonstrate AML compliance, operational controls and a sustainable business model; where those elements are in place, banking access follows authorisation, though account reviews and closures remain common. In our cross-border practice, we map the banking stack alongside the licensing path to ensure account continuity through go-live.

What safeguarding applies to client funds?

Safeguarding depends on the instrument and the entity's licence type. Under MiCA, a payment institution or e-money institution holding client fiat or stablecoin reserves must segregate those funds in a credit institution and ensure they are protected in the event of the intermediary's insolvency. CBDC settlement typically does not trigger safeguarding obligations because the balance resides on the central bank's ledger, not the intermediary's balance sheet. Where a platform handles both, safeguarding applies to the stablecoin and fiat legs, while CBDC settlement obligations focus on ledger accuracy and real-time reconciliation rather than reserve protection.

Which payment licence is required?

The licence requirement depends on the services offered and the instruments handled. CBDC settlement generally requires authorisation from the central bank, often limited to banks or licensed payment institutions participating in the pilot. Stablecoin issuance and intermediation require a payment-institution or e-money institution licence under MiCA, or a VASP registration in jurisdictions outside the EU. A business that offers both CBDC settlement and stablecoin services typically needs two parallel authorisations – one for each instrument – structured in separate legal entities to avoid regulatory overlap and to preserve operational flexibility if one licence is delayed or suspended.

About OBOLUS

OBOLUS is an independent digital-asset law boutique acting only for businesses. We advise exchanges, custodians, token issuers and funds on licensing across 70+ jurisdictions, on disputes and on-chain asset recovery across 25+ forums, and on the tax, banking and compliance that sit around them. Digital assets are the entirety of our practice. In our cross-border engagements, we assess regulatory classification against the substance of the business model and the rights conferred, not the marketing label a whitepaper applies. Operators building dual-rail infrastructure routinely face the structural question of whether to consolidate CBDC and stablecoin flows under a single entity or to split them across parallel authorisations; we map the licensing path, the capital requirement, the safeguarding obligation and the banking access for each leg, and deliver a scoped implementation roadmap that accounts for pilot timelines and MiCA compliance deadlines. To discuss your dual-instrument structure, contact info@oboluslaw.com.

By Victor Olsen, Regulatory & Compliance Analyst – Victor specialises in payment-services licensing, MiCA compliance and the cross-border regulatory architecture for stablecoin issuers and CBDC intermediaries.

Disclaimer. This publication is general information about the law and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for advice tailored to your circumstances. OBOLUS accepts no liability for action taken or not taken on the basis of this material. For advice on your situation, contact info@oboluslaw.com.

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